
































































































































































“A	 small	 slow-moving	Old	World	 lizard	with	a	prehensile	 tail,	 long	extensible	 tongue,	pro-


































































































during	spells	of	disorder	 (such	as	 crises,	natural	disasters,	pandemics),	 change	and	 related	
discourses	 become	 more	 pronounced	 (Duineveld,	 Van	 Assche,	 &	 Beunen,	 2017).	 Shock	
events,	after	all,	 tend	to	expose	the	weaknesses	or	 limits	of	established	structures,	and	as	
communications	 relating	 to	 these	 increase,	 people	 can	 become	 more	 aware	 of	 certain	
changes.	New	discourses	 can	 emerge	 that	make	 established	discourses	 less	 prominent.	 In	
their	wake,	 drama	usually	 unfolds	 as	 interpretations	of	 change	differ	 between	discourses.	
Conditioned	attempts	 to	maintain	 the	status	quo	come	head-to-head	with	eager	claims	of	
new	dawns.	Regardless	of	 the	outcome	of	 these	discursive	 clashes,	 change	always	 finds	 a	
way.	 It	 is	 the	 inevitable	evolution	of	all	 that	 seems	permanent:	an	 intermingling	of	nature	
and	fate	that	lacks	a	rulebook.		
This	PhD	thesis	 is	about	a	particular	human	preoccupation	with	change	that	 is	currently	 in	
fashion	and	has	been	for	the	last	sixty	years	or	so:	innovation.	Unlike	change,	innovation	is	a	
deliberate,	 human-made	 attempt	 to	 create	 novelty	 (and	manipulate	 change).	 Innovation,	





thesis	 I	 intend	to	examine	the	currently	unquestioned	belief	 in	 innovation.	Moving	beyond	
mainstream	discussions	about	the	means	and	ends,	measurement,	and	management	of	 in-
novation	and	its	implementation	in	organisations,	I	seek	to	explore	what	happens	when	or-









its	 recent	history	 shows	 an	 increasing	 interest,	 engagement,	 and	even	 fascination	with	 its	









Muñoz,	 &	 Garćia-Falcón,	 2003).	 Recent	 advancements	 in	 information	 and	 communication	
technologies	(ICTs)	have	increased	market	transparency	and	progressively	empowered	holi-















Despite	 all	 this,	 the	 outbound	 travel	 of	 the	 Dutch	 (population	 17	million)	 has	 been	 good	
business	for	decades	and	optimism	about	the	future	prevailed	 in	the	 industry.	 In	2018,	for	
instance,	the	Dutch	consumed	22.1	million	holidays	that	amounted	to	15	billion	Euros;	the	






















2012	 –	 followed	 by	 a	 research	 agenda	 for	 the	 Dutch	 outbound	 travel	 industry:	 Reiswerk,	
2015a.	This	report	presented	five	prioritised	themes	of	change,	 including	sustainability	and	
competition	&	 technology.	 In	2014,	ANVR	 joined	 research	programme	and	platform	Shop-
ping	2020	(INretail	&	NRW,	2014)	and	launched	a	similar	research	programme	and	platform	
in	partnership	with	Capgemini,	named	Travel	Tomorrow	(ANVR,	2015;	2014).	More	commis-
sioned	 reports	 followed	 (see	 e.g.	 Capgemini,	 2015;	 Cherrylab,	 2016).	 ANVR	 and	 Reiswerk	
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hosted	events	where	business	consultants,	management	gurus,	and	futurologists	presented	
future	 outlooks	 (see	 e.g.	 ANVR	&	 Capgemini,	 2015;	 Reiswerk,	 2015b).	 In	 2017,	 ANVR	 ap-
pointed	a	special	professor	of	‘innovation	in	tourism’	(ANVR,	2017)	who	delivered	his	inau-







om	 (even	 though	 the	 readership	 was	 decidedly	 Dutch).	 Capgemini’s	 consultants,	 for	 in-
stance,	talked	of	“digital	transformation”;	“flexible	responsive	culture”,	and	“massive	trans-
formative	 purpose”.	 Truisms	 and	 buzzwords	 were	 common	 too,	 like	 “never	 fail	 to	 fail”	
(ANVR	&	Capgemini,	2015;	Reiswerk,	2015b).	And	there	were	statements	that	I	interpreted	





The	discourses	 on	 innovation	 perplexed	me.	 They	 promoted	 innovation	 in	 absolute	 terms	
but	 justifications	for	the	proposed	course	of	action	were	rarely	offered.	The	word	 ‘innova-
tion’	dominated	in	all	aforementioned	documents	(Beulink	et	al.	2012	-	7	times;	Capgemini,	
2015	 -	 31	 times;	Hillebrand,	 2018	 -	 65	 times).	 It	was	depicted	 as	 a	 self-explanatory	noun,	
verb,	and/or	adjective.	None	of	 these	 texts	offered	an	explicit	definition	of	 innovation	but	
instead	 they	explained	 the	 term	 indirectly	 (see	e.g.	 Beulink	 et	 al.,	 2012;	Capgemini,	 2015;	
Cherrylab,	2016;	Hillebrand,	2018).	Innovation	was	said	to	be	about	the	introduction	of	new	
products,	 services,	 distribution	 channels	 and	 technologies	 to	 create	 functioning	 value-
propositions	(Hillebrand,	2018),	and	about	fundamentally	changing	the	ways	of	doing	busi-
ness	(Capgemini,	2015).	 It	required,	according	to	Capgemini	 (2015,	p.	161),	 the	creation	of	








of	 innovation	 in	 organisations.	 In	 its	 research	 agenda,	 Reiswerk	 (2015a)	 asked	 for	 studies	
examining	 the	 implementation	 of	 innovation	 in	 tourism	 supply	 chains.	 Hillebrand	 (2018)	
highlighted	the	 importance	of	 researching	the	 interrelations	between	 innovating	 firms	and	
their	environment.	He	called	for	guidelines	that	help	firms	in	addressing	the	obstacles	they	
encounter	when	innovating	in	collaboration	with	(the	firm’s)	stakeholders.	But	how	can	the	






These	 discourses	 took	 the	 idea	 of	 innovation	 for	 granted.	 Innovation	 seemed	 to	 be	 the	
buzzword	 of	 the	 day,	 revolving	 around	 technology	 and	 ecommerce	 enterprise.	 The	 afore-









innovation	 in	 tourism	 studies	 literature	 (hereafter	 referred	 to	 as	 tourism	 innovation	 re-












are	 unemployment	 and	 productivity.	 The	 conceptual	 framework	 comprises	 neo-classical	
economics	(price,	equilibrium)	and	econometrics.	There	is	limited	attention	for	policy.		
Joseph	Schumpeter’s	work	is	part	of	this	first	tradition.	Schumpeter	saw	innovation	as	new	
combinations	of	existing	knowledge	and	 resources	 that	drive	continuous	 social,	 economic,	
and	 institutional	 transformations	 (Fagerberg,	 Fosaas,	 &	 Sappraser,	 2012).	 Innovation,	 to	
Schumpeter,	was	a	source	of	energy	in	the	economic	system	that	would	disrupt	any	equilib-
rium	(Fagerberg	&	Verspagen,	2009).	His	 initial	 focus	was	on	the	 interaction	between	 indi-
viduals	(‘entrepreneurs’)	and	their	surroundings.	The	role	of	the	entrepreneur	was	to	intro-






death	–	Schumpeter’s	 ideas	about	 innovation	were	considered	a	 lost	 cause	 (Godin,	2012).	
Econometrics	and	equilibrium	studies	dominated	the	literature;	quantifications	that	Schum-
peter	 had	 always	 considered	 of	 limited	 use	 in	 advancing	 knowledge	 about	 economic	 and	
social	 change	 (Fagerberg	 &	 Verspagen,	 2009).	 Schumpeter	 would	 only	 gain	 fame	 posthu-
mously	(Godin,	2010;	2008).	Much	later,	in	the	second	half	of	the	20th	century,	he	was	selec-









rical	 as	 econometrics	 and	 equilibrium	 approaches	 had	 fallen	 out	 of	 fashion	 in	 the	 1960s;	
their	explanatory	power	was	considered	limited	(Fagerberg	&	Verspagen,	2009).	The	second	
tradition	developed	into	what	review	articles	generally	present	as	the	field	of	(technological)	
innovation	 studies:	 TIS	 (Godin,	 2012).	 As	 Fagerberg	 and	 Verspagen	 (2009)	 explain,	 TIS	
emerged	from	the	Cold	War	doctrine	in	the	United	States:	US	global	(economic)	dominance	
required	technological	supremacy.	Initial	research	therefore	focused	on	technology,	the	fac-




Important	 to	 this	expansion	was	 the	work	of	Christopher	Freeman,	but	 there	were	others	
too	(see	Martin,	2012).	As	Godin	(2012)	explains,	to	Freeman,	innovation	was	not	about	the	
use	of	technological	inventions	in	(industrial)	production,	but	about	the	commercialisation	of	
technological	 inventions	 for	 consumers	 and	 firms	 (so	 products	 and	 processes).	 Freeman’s	
book,	 entitled	The	 Economics	 of	 Industrial	 Innovation,	 and	 the	work	 of	 the	 Science	 Policy	




across	 Europe	 (Fagerberg	 &	 Verspagen,	 2009).	 An	 extensive	 literature	 has	 since	 emerged	
that	 studies	 how	 innovation	 takes	 place,	 its	 prime	 explanatory	 factors,	 and	 implications	




TIS	 claimed	 Schumpeter	 as	 a	 sort	 of	 ancestral	 scholarly	 father.	 The	 field	 did	 not	 need	
Schumpeter	to	discuss	many	of	the	issues	that	occupied	the	field:	particularly	the	commer-
cialisation	of	 technological	 invention	 (Godin,	 2012).	Unlike	 the	 first	 tradition	 (neo-classical	
economics),	 the	 second	 tradition	 lacked	 a	 conceptual	 framework	 of	 its	 own.	 Schumpeter	
served	to	fill	 this	void	(Godin,	2012).	TIS	review	articles	generally	present	Schumpeter	as	a	
key	figure	in	the	academic	field	(see	e.g.	Fagerberg	et	al.,	2012;	Martin,	2012).	In	this	litera-
ture,	 there	 are	 few	 references	 to	 publications	 on	 innovation	 prior	 to	 1960,	 apart	 from	
Schumpeter’s	work	(Fagerberg	&	Verspagen,	2009).	Schumpeter’s	ideas,	such	as	the	defini-
tion	 of	 innovation	 as	 new	 combinations	 of	 existing	 knowledge	 and	 resources;	 the	 inven-
tion/innovation	distinction;	and	classifications	of	 innovation	according	 to	 type	and	 radical-
ness	 of	 impact,	 were	 selectively	 rehabilitated	 (see	 e.g.	 Fagerberg	 et	 al.,	 2012;	 Fagerberg,	
2003).	They	were	placed	within	a	market	frame.	As	Godin	(2012)	argues,	Schumpeter	did	not	
analyse	 innovation	 in	 terms	 of	 commercialisation.	 TIS,	 thus,	 has	 iconised	 Schumpeter.	
Viewed	 in	 this	 way,	 Schumpeter’s	 prolonged	 existence	 in	 innovation	 research	 is	 arguably	
self-perpetuating.	
Firm-centeredness	–	the	second	characteristic	–	is	evident,	for	instance,	in	the	evolutionary	
(or	neo-Schumpeterian)	economics	 framework	 that	has	emerged	since	 the	1980s	 (see	e.g.	











TIS	 always	 had	 an	 attractive	 proposition	 for	 policymakers	 that	 supported	 governments	 in	
maximising	the	benefits	of	technological	innovation	(Godin,	2012).	New	products	were	em-
















In	 terms	 of	 focus,	 competitiveness	 and	 growth	 are	 also	 central	 to	 tourism	 innovation	 re-
search	(see	e.g.	Hall	&	Williams,	2019;	Hjalager,	2010;	Marasco	et	al.,	2018;	Ormerzel,	2016;	
Pikkemaat	et	al.,	2019;	Teixeira	&	Ferreira,	2018).	Tourism	innovation	research	–	again	like	
TIS	 –	 is	 predominantly	 firm-centred,	 focusing	 on	 tourism/hospitality	 firms	 and	 their	 envi-
ronment	 (see	 e.g.	Marasco	 et	 al.,	 2018;	 Ormerzel,	 2016).	 To	 include	 tourist	 destinations,	






tourism	 innovation	research.	 It	 traces	the	concept	to	the	early	 theoretical	contributions	of	
Schumpeter	(see	e.g.	Hjalager,	2010;	2002;	Ormerzel,	2016;	Pikkemaat	et	al.,	2019).	 It	also	
reproduces	 different,	 usually	 neo-Schumpeterian	 interpretations	 of	 Schumpeter’s	 ideas,	
including	 (neo-)	 Schumpeterian	 innovation	 definitions	 such	 as	 the	 one	 provided	 by	 OECD	
and	 Eurostat	 (2018)	 (see	 e.g.	 Pikkemaat	 et	 al.,	 2019);	 the	 innovation/invention	distinction	
(Hjalager	 2010,	 2002);	 (loose)	 interpretations	 of	 Schumpeter’s	 innovation	 classifications	
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(Hjalager,	2002;	Ormerzel,	2016;	Pikkemaat	et	al.,	2019);	and	the	role	of	Schumpeter’s	en-
trepreneur	 as	 an	 innovator	 and	 creator	 of	 new	 markets	 and	 products	 (Pikkemaat	 et	 al.,	
2019;	Hjalager,	2010).	 Thus,	 tourism	 innovation	 research	has	 largely	 ignored	 the	 first	 eco-
nomic	tradition	of	studying	technological	innovation	and	has	mirrored	TIS	in	its	adoption	of	
innovation	as	commercialised	 invention.	But	 it	has	also	struggled	with	 this	 imported	 inter-
pretation.		
The	 argument,	 as	 observed	 by	Montresor	 (2018),	 is	 as	 follows.	 The	 tourism	 industry	 –	 in	
comparison	 to	manufacturing	and	other	 services	–	has	 specific	 characteristics	 that	compli-




ing	 primarily	 concerned	with	manufacturing	 and	 high-tech	 industries	 –	 are	 therefore	 only	
partially	suitable	to	account	for	the	peculiarities	of	tourism	vis-à-vis	manufacturing	and	oth-
er	services	(Hall	&	Williams,	2019;	Hjalager,	2010;	Ormerzel,	2016;	Pikkemaat	et	al.,	2019).	
Equipped	with	 this	argument,	 tourism	 innovation	 research	has	embarked	on	a	quest	 for	a	
tailored	 approach	 to	 innovation	 in	 tourism	 (Hjalager,	 2002;	 Hjalager,	 2010).	 In	 doing	 so,	
Montresor	(2018)	argues,	it	has	departed	significantly	from	key	aspects	of	the	imported	in-
novation	theories,	but	without	considering	the	deeper	implications	of	these	theories.	In	oth-




The	 rise	 of	 the	 second	 tradition	 in	 the	 technological	 innovation	 literature	 –	 commonly	
known	as	technological	innovation	studies	(TIS)	–	has	altered	and	narrowed	the	interpreta-
tion	of	 technological	 innovation:	 innovation	as	 technological	 change	has	been	 confined	 to	


















tion;	 and	 social	 innovation	 –	 as	means	 to	 address	 contemporary	 sustainability	 challenges	
(see	e.g.	Hellstrom,	2003;	Soete,	2013;	Lechevalier,	2019).	Tourism	innovation	research	has	
picked	up	some	of	these	labels.	Pikkemaat	et	al.	(2019),	for	instance,	see	eco-innovation	as	
an	 emerging	 field	 that	 should	 identify	 the	 drivers	 enabling	 sustainable	 innovations.	 These	

























about	 innovation’s	 alleged	purpose	and	 characteristics	 (Law,	1992).	 Instead,	 the	proposed	
framework	 considers	 innovation	 in	 broad	 terms,	 as	 a	 collective,	 coordinated	 response	 to	
particular,	 perceived	manifestations	 of	 change.	 It	 views	 innovation	 –	 and	 its	 central	 tenet	
‘inventiveness’	 –	 as	 an	 inherent	 feature	 of	 all	 organisational	 practices	 (Barba	 Lata,	 2017),	





tral	 characteristic	 of	 these	 theories	 adopted	 in	 the	 framework	 is	 the	 tendency	 to	 explain	
interactions	between	material	and	social	worlds	with	the	help	of	an	integrated	ontology	and	
epistemology,	as	discussed	next.		
An	 integrated	 ontology	 and	 epistemology	 assumes	 that	 what	 is	 real	 cannot	 be	 separated	
from	what	 is	 known	 (Law,	 2007).	Materiality	 –	 physical	 elements,	 matter,	 and	 substance	
extending	beyond	the	social	and	constituting	its	environment	–	exists	(is	real),	but	cannot	be	
objectively	verified	(known).	The	production	of	meaning	is	always	selective	and	necessarily	
incomplete	 (Howarth,	2000).	With	a	single,	absolute	 reality	permanently	out	of	 reach,	dis-
tinctions	between	social	and	material	worlds	are	difficult	 to	dissect,	and	–	 in	 the	perspec-








isations	 and	 evoke	 responses.	 In	 these	 situations,	 innovation	 comes	 into	 play.	 Discourses	





ties	 and	 other,	 rivalling	 discourses,	 creating	 ongoing	 evolution	 (Van	 Assche	 et	 al.,	 2014).	
Viewed	in	this	way,	innovation	is	a	collective	and	continuous	response	to	change	that	com-
prises	and	entwines	material	and	discursive	dimensions.		
To	 examine	 the	 functioning	 of	 innovation	 as	 response	 to	 change	 in	 the	 Dutch	 outbound	
travel	 industry,	 I	adopt	two	notions	from	Evolutionary	Governance	Theory:	material	events	
(Duineveld	et	al.,	2017)	and	reality	effects	(Van	Assche	et	al.,	2020;	2014).		
Material	 events	 (hereafter	 referred	 to	 as	 events)	 are	 the	 relations	 between	 (a	 particular)	
changing	materiality	and	the	construction	of	interpretations	and	responses	through	distinct	
organisational	practices	embedded	in	different	discourses	(Duineveld	et	al.,	2017).	Only	un-
observed	 or	 unrecognised	material	 change	 lacks	 a	 social	 existence:	 it	 is,	 Duineveld	 et	 al.	
(2017)	explain,	imagined	at	best.	Once	noticed,	material	change	enters	reality	as	the	subject	
of	different	 interpretations.	 Identified	temperature	changes,	for	 instance,	can	become	part	
of	 climate	 change	 discourses	 that	 expose	 the	 aviation-dependency	 of	 tourism,	 triggering	
resistance	 and	 inspiring	 people	 to	 look	 for	 alternatives.	 Likewise,	 business	 discourses	 pre-
senting	 novel	 technologies	 as	 disruptions	 can	 provoke	 incumbents	 to	 adjust	 or	 reinforce	
their	operational	 routines.	Some	events,	Duineveld	et	al.	 (2017)	explain,	 linger	 in	 the	back	
and	do	not	 lead	 to	 action,	while	others	become	more	 vigorous	over	 time	and	have	wide-
spread	 implications.	The	notion	of	events	 is	useful	here	because	 it	highlights	 that	 ‘change’	
evolves	through	interplay	between	material	and	social	worlds.	This	makes	it	possible	to	free	





of	 actors	 (Van	 Assche	 et	 al.,	 2020).	 Reality	 effects	 accentuate	 the	 performativity	 of	 these	
responses.	Narratives	about	change	and	innovation	–	in	other	words,	communications	–	can	










are	 observed	 changes	 in	 the	 physical	 environment	 that	 have	 entered	 different	 social	 sys-
tems,	like	the	various	interpretations	of	climate	change	(see	e.g.	Hall,	Amelung,	&	Cohen	et	
al.,	2014;	2015;	Shani	&	Arad,	2014;	2015	for	a	discussion	in	tourism	studies).	Discursive	real-




influenced	 public	 perceptions	 and	 representations	 of	 the	 relations	 between	 aviation	 and	
climate	 change	 (see	 e.g.	 Cohen,	 Higham,	 &	 Cavaliere,	 2011;	 Gössling,	 Humpe,	 &	 Bausch,	
2020;	Cohen).	In	such	heated	debates,	when	actors	attempt	to	come	to	terms	with	various	











at	different	organisational	 levels:	 the	contribution	of	 the	 travel	 industry	 to	climate	change	
and	 the	 erosion	of	 the	dominant	middleman	position	of	 travel	 industry	 incumbents.	 I	will	





can	 be	 applied	 to	 a	 predefined	 problem	of	 some	 kind	 (for	more	 on	 this	 see	 Czarniawska,	
1998).	 Rather,	 as	 Beard,	 Scarles,	 and	 Tribe	 (2016)	 explain,	 I	 consider	 method	 as	 the	 se-








it	 resembled	my	 perceptions	 of	 an	 initial	 context,	 connecting	 a	 collection	 of	 events	 that	 I	
attended	and	commissioned	 reports	 that	 I	 read.	As	my	examinations	progressed,	 the	 field	





tion	 requires	 flexibility:	 the	 possibility	 to	 change	 directions	 and	 include	 new	 events	 or	 in-
formants	as	the	researcher	learns	more	about	a	subject	(Beard	et	al.,	2016).	
In	this	thesis,	I	therefore	adopted	a	process-oriented	case-study	approach.	As	Law	(2007,	p.	






















ject	at	 the	 time	 (see	chapter	2).	The	expert	 initially	 started	as	a	 follow-up	study;	after	 the	
machine	was	published,	I	was	invited	to	examine	the	impact	of	this	innovation	project.	I	dis-
covered	 that	 it	 was	 not	 this	 project,	 but	 a	 PhD	 thesis	 from	 Peeters	 (2017)	 that	 played	 a	



















































































gressive	 combinations	 of	 purposive	 and	 snowball	 sampling	 (Latour,	 2005)	 enabled	me	 to	
integrate	data	generation	and	analysis	(Beard	et	al.,	2016).	The	data	generation	techniques	I	
deployed	(table	1-1)	not	only	served	to	accumulate	materials	for	analysis	at	a	later	moment;	























Abstract	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 			
Eco-innovations	that	reduce	carbon	emissions	help	advance	sustainability	transitions	in	tour-
ism.	This	chapter	examines	the	analytical	potential	of	actor-network	theory	(ANT)	to	study	




eco-innovations	 equal	 analytical	 treatment.	We	 therefore	develop	 an	ANT-inspired	 frame-
work,	 which	 we	 apply	 in	 a	 case	 study	 to	 investigate	 the	 development	 of	 a	 specific	 eco-
innovation:	 CARMACAL,	 a	web-based	 carbon	management	 application	 in	 the	 Dutch	 travel	
industry.	 We	 find	 that	 technological	 novelty	 alone	 is	 insufficient	 to	 instigate	 transition.	
CARMACAL	 affords	 multiple	 new	 practices	 with	 opposite	 implications	 for	 socio-economic	
and	 environmental	 sustainability.	 The	 practices	 triggering	most	 industry	 support	 are	 least	








Buijtendijk,	 H.,	 Blom,	 J.,	 Vermeer,	 J.,	&	Van	 der	Duim,	 V.R.	 Eco-innovation	 for	 sustainable	
tourism	transitions	as	a	process	of	collaborative	co-production:	 the	case	of	a	carbon	man-





Carbon	 emission	 reductions	 are	 crucial	 for	 sustainability	 transitions	 in	 tourism	 (Peeters,	




theoretical	 perspectives	 to	 study	 eco-innovation,	 such	 as	 innovation	 theories,	 institutional	
theory,	stakeholder	theory	and	the	resource-based	view	(see	Hojnik	&	Ruzzier,	2016).	Yet,	all	
of	these	theories	are	human-centred	approaches.	They	present	eco-innovation	as	an	exclu-
sive	challenge	for	businesses	and	explain	 it	with	social	variables	only.	Accordingly,	 they	 lo-
cate	eco-innovation	 in	society;	a	stable	domain	created	by	science,	separated	 from	nature	
and	 in	 times	of	 constant	 climatic	 conditions	 (Latour,	2014).	However,	 tourism	 research	on	








Instead,	 ANT	 assumes	 reality	 is	 a	 collection	 of	 actor-networks	 of	 human	 and	 non-human	
elements,	where	 actors	 exist	 as	 network	 effects	 (Latour,	 2005).	 Consequently,	 there	 is	 no	
separation	between	reality	and	its	explanations.	Rather	than	adding	another	theoretical	per-




Tourism	 research	 has	 discussed	 ANT’s	 conceptual	 premises	 and	 contributions	 to	 different	
tourism	 contexts	 (see	 Van	 der	 Duim,	 Ren,	 &	 Jóhannesson,	 2017).	 However,	 ANT	 has	 not	
been	used	to	study	eco-innovations	aimed	at	emission	reductions,	although	the	uncertain-
ties	emerging	when	humans,	 technology	and	nature	collide	are	particularly	 suitable	 for	an	
34	
ANT	 approach.	 This	 chapter	 therefore	 aims	 to	 explore	 ANT’s	 analytical	 potential	 to	 study	
eco-innovation	by	means	of	 a	 particular	 case:	 the	development	of	 a	 Carbon	Management	





and	 results.	 This	 case	 illustrates	 our	 argument.	 We	 see	 how	 three	 distinct	 versions	 of	
CARMACAL	are	simultaneously	performed,	while	CARMACAL’s	different	(human)	represent-
atives	 are	 disputed.	 We	 conclude	 that,	 when	 examined	 through	 ANT,	 technology-
sustainability	 interrelations	 in	 eco-innovations	 like	 CARMACAL	 are	 indeed	 ambiguous	
(Gössling,	2016),	but	not	necessarily	 contradictory.	Finally,	we	 identify	 research	and	policy	
implications	in	the	sustainability	transitions	field.	
2.2. Actor-network	theory	and	eco-innovation	
According	 to	Gad	and	 Jensen	 (2010,	p.	71),	ANT	 is	a	 research	approach	 that	assumes	 that	
“reality	 exists	 in	 multiple	 related	 versions”	 as	 dynamic,	 performed	 effects	 of	 constantly	
evolving	 actor-networks,	 and	 therefore	 cannot	 be	 separated	 from	 its	 theoretical	 explana-
tions.	 Thus,	 neither	 climate	 change	 nor	 eco-innovations	 occur	 as	 “mute	material”,	 sitting	
“passively	behind	the	perspectives”	in	a	single	world,	waiting	“to	be	gazed	at	from	different	
angles”	(p.	71).	Instead,	ANT	proposes	that	both	are	found	in	different,	overlapping	versions,	
as	 products	 of	 their	 own	 (competing)	 clarifications.	 Rather	 than	 adding	 more	 theoretical	
explanations	by	abstracting	issues	from	their	context,	ANT	helps	us	to	understand	the	world	
as	multiple,	by	examining	new	realities	as	they	emerge	and,	simultaneously,	create	the	set-
tings	 for	 their	 own	 analysis	 (Ren,	 2011).	 In	 our	 situation,	 this	 means	 reframing	 eco-
innovation	as	(the	performed	effect	of)	an	unfolding	actor-network,	so	that	it	can	be	looked	
at	differently	and	new	questions	can	be	asked	about	it	(Bramwell,	2015).	In	this	exploration	


























innovation	 effort	 may	 appear	 in	 different,	 co-existing	 variants,	 performed	 in	 overlapping	
actor-networks.		




all	 network	 elements	 are	 ontologically	 equal	 (Haug,	 2012).	 Non-human	 elements	 should	




technologies,	 emission	 measurements),	 and	 elements	 of	 the	 Earth’s	 climate	 (e.g.	 carbon	
dioxide,	surface	temperatures),	while	all	these	categories	are	in	flux.		
Reviewing	 literature	 that	 examines	 the	 responsibilities	 of	 businesses	 for	 addressing	 their	






tions	 in	 different	 industry	 domains	 (see	 for	 instance	 Razumova,	 Ibáñez,	 &	 Palmer,	 2015;	
Smerecnik	&	Andersen,	2011)	and	in	the	presumption	in	climate	change	research	that	struc-
tural	reduction	of	human	greenhouse	gas	emissions	will	reciprocally	stabilise	global	warming	
(Scott,	Gössling,	Hall,	&	Peeters,	 2016a;	 Scott,	Hall,	&	Gössling,	 2016b).	 In	both	 cases	 it	 is	
assumed	that	human	determinants	will	bring	about	the	desired	result;	nature	has	been	left	
out	 of	 the	 equation.	 Yet,	 evidence	 in	 Earth	 system	 research	 suggests	 that	 it	 is	 uncertain	
whether	or	not	effective	global	governance	towards	long-term	sustainability	would	halt	cli-
matic	 movement;	 climate	 shifts	 may	 carry	 sufficient	 momentum	 for	 an	 irreversible	 drift	
away	from	climate	stability	(Barnosky	et	al.,	2012;	Steffen	et	al.,	2011).	It	is	therefore	plausi-
ble	that	industries	will	increasingly	and	continuously	change.	Consequently,	there	is	value	in	
an	 approach	 that	 reaches	 beyond	 presupposed	 object-subject	 divisions	 to	 examine	 eco-
innovations	(Gren	&	Huijbens,	2012).		
Moving	 to	multiplicity,	 we	 notice	 that	 businesses,	 and	 their	 eco-innovation	 activities,	 are	





going	 translations.	 Sustainability	 reporting,	 for	 instance,	 tends	 to	 focus	 on	 the	 outputs	 of	
businesses	 rather	 than	 the	 different	 practices	 producing	 and	 performing	 those	 outputs	












business	 resources	 and	management	 subjects	 (see	 Coles,	Warren,	 Borden,	&	Dinan,	 2017	
and	Razumova	et	al.,	2015	respectively),	illustrating	that	“the	environment”	lacks	clear	con-
ceptualisation	(Coles	et	al.,	2013).	Likewise,	material	entities	like	information	and	communi-











to	 ANT,	 being	 a	 collection	 of	 “tools	 for	making	 and	 knowing	 new	 realities”	 (Law	 &	 Urry,	
2005,	p.	98).	The	first	 line	of	enquiry	encourages	researchers	not	to	make	a-priori	assump-















innovations	 unfold?	 Rather	 than	 explaining	 or	 predicting	 eco-innovations	 as	 the	 results	 of	
causal	 antecedents,	 the	 enquiry	must	 acknowledge	 head-on	 the	 difficulties	 of	 addressing	
environmental	 challenges	 while	 all	 entities	 keep	 changing	 (Latour,	 2014).	 Kasim,	 Gursoy,	
Okumus,	 &	Wong	 (2014)	 for	 instance	 describe	 an	 eco-innovation	 in	which	 hoteliers	work	
with	different	plants	in	a	wetland	area	to	recycle	the	wastewater	of	their	resort.	As	the	be-
haviour	of	these	plants	is	unpredictable,	the	hoteliers	ask	scientists	to	regularly	monitor	the	





Callon	 (1986)	 suggests	 translation	happens	 in	 four	overlapping	moments	 (M1-M4).	During	
M1	 a	 common	 goal	 emerges,	 which	 makes	 an	 actor-network	 detectable.	 It	 is	 completed	
when	the	identities	of	actors	are	defined	in	relation	to	the	achievement	of	that	goal.	During	
M2	these	actors	(are	made	to)	temporally	assume	specific	roles	and	tasks,	which	stabilises	








it	 is	 relevant,	 the	central	question	here	 is:	 in	what	ways	 is	a	particular	eco-innovation	per-
formed?	Any	entity	is	enacted	through	its	network	and	therefore	cannot	simply	be	assumed	
to	 be	 an	 actor.	 Instead,	 the	 enquiry	must	 identify	 “what	 is	 included	 and	 authorised,	 and	
what	is	rejected	and	made	absent,	as	well	as	how	this	is	done”	(Ren,	Jóhannesson,	&	Van	der	
Duim,	 2012,	 p.	 19).	 Research	 on	 the	 environmental	management	 of	 small	 businesses,	 for	
example,	showed	how	a	non-human	entity	(an	environmental	certification	scheme)	is	simul-
taneously	performed	 in	different	ways	 through	variations	 in	management	approaches	and	
rationales	 (Sampaio,	Thomas,	&	Font,	2012).	Uncovering	how	 these	multiple	modes	of	or-
dering	emerge	and	frame	their	own	conditions	for	success	and	failure	can	help	us	to	see	an	
object,	which	may	at	 first	have	appeared	to	be	singular,	as	enacted	 in	multiple	versions	 in	
different,	overlapping	networks.		
The	third	proposal,	putting	humans	and	non-humans	on	an	equal	analytical	footing,	requires	
symmetrical	 analytical	 treatment	 of	 all	 elements	 that	 enact	 eco-innovation.	 The	 central	
question	 to	 this	 is:	What	 differences	 exist	 between	 representations	 of	 humans	 and	 non-


















































dealt	with	a	 specific,	 small-sized	population	 (the	 initiators	of	CARMACAL	and	 the	product-
level	managers	of	a	large	tour	operator,	respectively).	Both	studies	had	a	diverse	sample	of	
respondents.	For	Study	I,	we	approached	respondents	by	email,	resulting	in	18	participants	




destination	 were	 selected	 to	 secure	 a	 diverse	 product	 sample	 for	 the	 calculation	 of	 eco-
efficiency	 ratios.	 Per	 destination,	 the	 most-booked	 products	 and	 durations	 were	 picked,	
generating	 90	 itineraries.	 Six	 participants	 (equally	 representative	 of	 Study	 I	 and	 II)	 were	
handpicked	 for	Study	 III	based	on	 the	diversity	of	 their	 inputs	 in	 the	 first	 interview	round;	
thus	 ensuring	 that	 our	 data	 “convey	not	 one,	 but	many	 versions	of	 object	 realities”	 (Ren,	
2011,	 p.	 866).	 One	 additional	 respondent,	 the	 general	 director	 of	 a	 tour	 operator	 not	 in-
volved	in	CARMACAL	and	business	partner	of	one	of	the	respondents,	offered	an	outsider’s	
perspective.	Table	2-1	presents	the	interviews	and	respondents.		
Moving	 to	 data	 collection,	 to	 ensure	 complete	 coverage,	 semi-structured	 interviews	were	
conducted	in	Studies	I	and	II,	because	of	the	possibility	to	follow	up	on	topics	introduced	by	
respondents.	 The	unstructured	 interview	 technique	was	applied	 in	 Study	 III	 because	 it	 ac-
commodates	 in-depth	discussion	on	 specific	 topics,	 giving	 respondents	 the	 liberty	 to	 illus-
trate	 relevance,	 importance,	 and	 interrelations	 (Yin,	 2009).	 For	 the	 semi-structured	 inter-
views,	 we	 composed	 two	 lists	 covering	 topics	 related	 to	 CARMACAL’s	 development	 in	
CARMATOP	and	adoption	by	small	to	medium-sized	enterprise	(SME)	tour	operators	(Study	
I)	 and	CARMACAL’s	 implementation	by	a	 large	 tour	operator	 (Study	 II).	Both	 lists	 included	
open-ended	and	generic,	guiding	questions	that	served	to	probe	respondents	to	elaborate.	
In	 the	 unstructured	 interviews	 (Study	 III),	 respondents	 were	 asked	 to	 chronologically	 de-





In	 all	 the	 interviews,	 questions	were	 tailored	 to	 the	 respondent’s	 context.	We	 gave	 them	
room	 to	 pick	 topics	 for	more	 detailed	 discussion.	 By	 probing,	 using	 “how	 questions”,	 re-
spondents	were	encouraged	to	describe	rather	than	explain	events,	enabling	the	reconstruc-
tion	of	processes	over	time.	Question	order	varied	per	interview.	We	added	questions	based	
on	 insights	 from	 previous	 interviews,	 updating	 the	 guidelines	 accordingly.	 Combined,	 this	




Respondent		 Position	 Organisation	 Date	of	interview	
Study	1	
R1	 General	Director	 Tour	operator	(SME)	 02-03-2016	
R2	 General	Director	 Tour	operator	(SME)	 09-03-2016	
R3	 Sustainability	Coordinator	 Tour	operator	 10-03-2016	
R4	 Travel	Expert	 Tour	operator	(SME)	 15-03-2016	
R5	 General	Director	 Tour	operator	(SME)	 17-03-2016	
R6	 Sales	&	Marketing	Manager	 Tour	operator	(SME)	 16-03-2016	
R7	 Sustainability	Coordinator	 Tour	operator	(SME)	 21-03-2016	
R8	 Product	Manager	 Tour	operator	(SME)	 22-03-2016	
R9	 Tour	Operations	Manager	 Tour	operator	(SME)	 23-03-2016	
R10	 General	Director	 Tour	operator	(SME)	 14-03-2016	
R11	 Sustainability	coordinator	 Tour	operator	 30-04-2016	
R12	 Junior	Carbon	Advisor	 Consultancy	agency	 25-03-2016	
R13	 Manager	 Certification	programme	 01-04-2016	
R14	 Researcher	 Research	institute	 24-02-2016	
R15	 Researcher	 Research	institute	 25-02-2016	
R16	 Manager	 Industry	association	 18-03-2016	
Study	2	
R17	 Product	Manager	 Tour	operator	 09-05-2016	
R18	 Sustainability	Manager	 Tour	operator	 10-05-2016	
R19	 Product	Manager	 Tour	operator	 13-05-2016	
R20	 Product	Manager	 Tour	operator	 13-05-2016	
R21	 Product	Manager	 Tour	operator	 24-05-2016	
Study	3	
R22	&	R23	 General	Directors	 Tour	operator	A+B	(SMEs)	 07-10-2016	
R24	 General	Director	 Tour	operator	(SME)	 21-12-2016	
R25	&	R26	 Product	 Manager	 &	 Sus-
tainability	Manager	
Tour	operator	 21-12-2016	








lished	 reports.	 Resulting	 text	 was	 then	 chronologically	 ordered	 using	 Callon’s	 (1986)	 mo-
ments	of	translation	and	further	validated	through	conversations	with	key	informants,	ena-
bling	the	identification	of	different	evolving	modes	of	ordering.	In	this	way,	we	were	able	to	




In	 this	 case	 study,	we	present	CARMACAL	as	 an	unfolding	 actor-network.	As	 an	 actor,	we	




representatives	attempted	to	give	the	climate	 (reduction	of	CO2	emissions)	a	place	 in	 tour	
operating	practices.	Below	we	trace	the	evolution	of	this	actor-network	in	accordance	with	






late	 the	 carbon	 footprints	 of	 its	 long-haul	 group	 tours	 so	 that	 it	 could	 start	 offsetting	 its	
travel-related	emissions	(R2).	CSTT	is	a	research	organisation	within	NHTV	Breda	University	





Then,	 in	 January	 2012,	 the	 tour	 operator	 shared	 its	 experience	with	 other	 tour	 operators	
and	 the	Dutch	Association	of	Travel	Agents	 (ANVR)	 in	 their	 regular	 sustainability	 frontrun-
ners	meeting	during	the	Vakantiebeurs	(Dutch	Travel	Trade	Show).	At	these	meetings,	ANVR	
(representing	approximately	226	travel	agents	(ANVR,	2013))	and	a	small	group	of	tour	op-
erators	 convened	 to	 promote	 sustainability.	 The	 topic	 picked	 up	 collective	 interest.	 Some	
present	at	this	meeting	had	just	attended	a	presentation	about	carbon	labelling	by	professor	
Gössling,	an	international	expert	on	tourism	and	climate	change.			
	 “His	story	about	 labelling	was	 really	 inspiring;	how	 important	 labelling	 is	 to	get	 the	
	 sustainability	movement	going.”	(R1)		
Gössling’s	presentation	mobilised	attendants	to	collaborate:		
	 “If	 everybody	 starts	 his	 own	 label,	we	 risk	 ending	 up	with	 36	 different	 labels.	Why	
	 not	 make	 it	 an	 industry-wide	 initiative?	 We	 started	 a	 project	 group	 and	 involved	
	 others.”	(R1)		
They	 agreed	 to	 develop	 a	 single	 application	 that	 could	 consistently	 calculate	 the	 carbon	
footprint	of	tour	packages.	Concurrently,	by	establishing	a	project	group	with	a	shared	goal,	
a	network	emerged.		
Up	until	 that	point,	distinct	carbon	management	 ideas	had	 left	traces	 in	this	network.	Car-
bon	offsetting,	 the	rationale	of	a	tour	operator’s	 initial	research	request	to	CSTT,	concerns	
compensation	 payments	 to	 non-tourism	 parties	 to	 achieve	 carbon	 savings	 equivalent	 to	
tourism	emissions	(see	Eijgelaar,	2011).	Carbon	reduction,	instrumental	in	much	CSTT	work,	
constitutes	the	decarbonisation	of	global	tourism	(see	Scott	et	al.,	2016a).	Carbon	labelling,	
triggering	 tour	 operator	 participation,	 is	 about	 communication	 that	 stimulates	 climate-





projects	 led	 by	 a	 university	 of	 applied	 sciences	 that	 include	 knowledge	 development	 and	







The	 resultant	CARMATOP	project	 started	 the	beginning	of	 2013.	CSTT	 led	 the	project	 and	










The	 following	 two	 years	 the	 network	 expanded.	More	 tour	 operators	 joined	 CARMATOP.	
They	did	 so	 for	 various	 reasons,	 such	 as	 altruistic	motives	 (R2,	 R11),	 securing	 their	 future	
business	(R11),	transparency	(R2,	R16),	anticipating	growing	consumer	awareness	and	strict-
er	regulation	(R11),	and	stimulating	employee	loyalty	(R14).	CARMATOP	also	generated	(in-
ternational)	 attention	 from	 various	 industry	 organisations,	 including	 the	 United	 Nations	
World	 Tourism	 Organisation	 and	 the	 World	 Travel	 &	 Tourism	 Council	 (CSTT,	 2017a).	
CARMATOP	concluded	in	June	2015,	when	the	Carbon	Management	Calculator	(CARMACAL)	














ran	up	against	different	operational	 routines.	CARMACAL’s	 calculations	would	enable	 tour	
operators	to	identify	product	modifications	that	would	reduce	the	carbon	emissions	of	their	













ficient	 (R23,	 R24,	 25,	 R26).	 Correspondingly,	 the	 tour	 operators	 found	 it	 hard	 to	 see	 the	
tool’s	usefulness.		
However,	CARMACAL	also	sparked	new	practices,	each	creating	 its	own	controversies	(Cal-
lon,	 1986).	 In	 the	 years	 after	 CARMATOP,	 the	 different	 ideas	 about	 carbon	management	











The	working	group	disagreed	on	whether	 the	 label	should	be	normative,	 for	 instance	with	


























reduction	 targets	 for	 themselves	 (R14).	 Carbon	 reduction	was	 controversial,	 however,	 be-






Many	of	 them	did	not	believe	 in	carbon	reduction	goals,	because	sooner	rather	 than	 later	




However,	 in	 2016,	 one	 tour	 operator	 commissioned	 a	 study	 on	 how	 it	 could	 use	 eco-
efficiency,	which	are	ratios	expressing	the	environmental	costs	of	business	(see	Caiado,	Dias,	
Mattos,	Quelhas,	&	Filho,	2017),	in	portfolio	management.	Using	the	CO2/profit	margin	ratio,	
the	 study	presented	 the	eco-efficiency	of	different	product	 samples	and	visualised	 the	 re-
sults	 in	scatterplots	(see	Figure	2-4	for	an	example).	These	visuals	made	managers	wonder	




indicator	 of	 economic	 performance	 (R25,	 R26).	 They	 planned	 to	 address	 these	 questions	
through	further	research.		
	









part	were	reluctant	to	communicate	negative	messages	 (R23).	 In	general,	 they	did	not	be-
lieve	in	offsetting,	as	it	lacked	credibility:			












and	 its	 end	 users,	 these	multiplied	 again	 in	 the	 years	 after	 the	 project.	 The	 simultaneous	
performance	 of	 multiple	 carbon	 management	 approaches,	 each	 connoting	 distinct	 ideas	
about	the	relation	between	nature	and	society,	illustrates	the	network’s	multiplicity	(Gad	&	
Jensen,	 2010).	 Concurrently,	 as	 we	 will	 show	 next,	 the	 positions	 of	 CARMACAL’s	 various	
(human)	representatives	had	come	under	increasing	scrutiny.			
2.4.4. M4:	Disputing	CARMACAL’s	(human)	representatives	(2016-2018)	
Despite	 international	 attention,	 only	 a	 few	 CARMACAL	 licences	 had	 been	 sold	 (R14),	 not	
enough	 to	 keep	 CARMACAL	 operational	 (R24).	 The	 CARMACAL	 foundation,	 which	 owned	
CARMACAL,	had	been	making	continuous	efforts	to	secure	industry	investments	and	further	
subsidies	 (R24).	 Amidst	 this	 uncertainty,	 the	 positions	 of	 CARMACAL’s	 different	 (human)	
spokespersons,	which	had	been	established	during	CARMATOP,	weakened	because,	 in	 the	






and	 assess	 all	 available	 technologies	 before	 building	 CARMACAL	 (R22)?	 Is	 CNG	 genuinely	
interested	in,	and	capable	of,	selling	CARMACAL	licenses	(R23,	R24)?	And	why,	despite	the	
enormous	amount	of	 (international)	publicity,	has	ANVR	so	far	 failed	to	convince	 its	mem-
bers	to	adopt	CARMACAL	(R27)?	
52	
Reversely,	 the	 CSTT	 researchers	wonder,	 in	 hindsight,	whether	 the	 group	 of	 sustainability	




ions	 and,	 consequently,	 ill-suited	 to	 persuade	 mainstream	 tour	 operators	 to	 participate	
(R28).	They	also	wonder	how	many	licences	CARMACAL	would	have	sold	if	they	had	included	
business	 travel	 operators	 in	 CARMATOP	 and	 feel	 RAAK’s	 SME	 focus	 limited	 CARMACAL’s	
impact,	theorising	about	what	would	have	happened	if	they	had	developed	CARMACAL	with	
a	large	tour	operator	(R28).		





levels	as	well	 (R26).	Those	advocating	 triple	bottom	 line	approaches	accuse	CARMACAL	of	
single-mindedness,	 claiming	 that	 sustainability	 is	 about	 more	 than	 “climate”	 or	 “nature”.	
They	call	for	integrated	measurement	that	also	accounts	for	the	socio-economic	impacts	of	












The	 position	 of	 the	 tour	 package	 as	 the	 travel	 industry’s	 most	 suitable	 representative	 is	
equally	challenged.	Would	CARMACAL	be	more	effective	(i.e.	sell	more	licenses)	if	 it	repre-




They	 only	 appeared	 as	 actors	 when	 they	 participated	 in	 research	 on	 labelling	 during	 the	
CARMATOP	project.	Beyond	that,	they	have	been	(made)	absent	in	the	network	(Ren	et	al.,	






























help	discover	new	orders	 (Gad	&	 Jensen,	 2010).	We	 therefore	argue	 that	ANT’s	 analytical	
tools	are	relevant	to	understanding	eco-innovations	in	the	broader	sustainability	transitions	
field.	 The	 three	overlapping	 lines	of	 enquiry	 this	 chapter	proposes,	 demonstrate	 the	 chal-




The	 first	 line	of	enquiry	explained	eco-innovation	as	a	state	of	 flux,	which	 is	not	easily	ex-
plained	 with	 presupposed	 object-subject	 divisions	 (Gren	 &	 Huijbens,	 2012).	 By	 tracing	
CARMACAL’s	 translations	 over	 time	 (Law,	 1992),	we	 found	 that	 different	 carbon	manage-







required	 leadership	 (Scott	 et	 al.,	 2016a),	 or,	 in	 ANT	 terms,	 strong	 spokespersons	 (Callon,	






The	 second	 line	 of	 enquiry	 provided	 evidence	 of	 how	 one	 specific	 eco-innovation	 is	 per-
formed	in	a	variety	of	ways.	By	regarding	CARMACAL	as	a	changing	actor-network,	we	were	
able	 to	 overcome	 distinctions	 between	 actors	 and	 their	 outputs,	 enabling	 an	 integrated	
analysis	of,	for	instance,	global	challenges	and	the	business	organisation	(Scherer	&	Palazzo,	
2011),	or	businesses	and	their	sustainability	reports	(Font	et	al.,	2016;	Coles	et	al.,	2014).	In	
our	 study,	we	 saw	 that	 CARMACAL	makes	 three	 distinct	 carbon	management	 approaches	
possible	(Figure	2-5),	with	each	prescribing	its	own	conditions	for	success	and	failure.	First,	
carbon	 labelling,	 implemented	 via	 a	 consumer	 label,	 presents	 nature	 (to	 consumers).	 Se-








pealing	products.	 It	 also	 showed	 from	“it	 threatens	our	business”	 statements,	which	were	
justified	with	arguments	such	as	“we	can’t	change	that”,	“customers	won’t	understand”	or	
“we	are	not	going	to	ask	our	customers	to	travel	 less”.	Likewise,	this	bias	was	evident	 in	 i)	
statements	that	sustainability	is	about	more	than	climate	or	nature;	ii)	attempts	to	compen-













ferent	 categories”	 that	 cannot	 be	 exchanged;	weak	 sustainability	 allows	 compensation	 of	
current	 losses	of	natural	resources	with	 increased	future	human	capital	(Hansson,	2010,	p.	
275).	 Strong	 sustainability,	 exemplified	 in	 emission	 reduction	 strategies	 and	 low-carbon	
tourism	(Becken,	2017),	builds	on	Earth	systems	notions	and	imagines	a	socio-technical	fu-
ture	 in	 which	 substantive	 socio-ecological	 values	 are	 reasserted	 through	 socio-economic	
dematerialisation	(Strand,	Saltelli,	Giampietro,	Rommetveit,	&	Funtowicz,	2016).	Weak	sus-
tainability,	inherent	in	carbon	offsetting	and	the	triple	bottom	line	paradigm	(Isil	&	Hernke,	
2017),	 builds	 on	 technological	 determinism	 and	 imagines	 a	 socio-technological	 future	 in	
which,	despite	ecological	challenges,	human	conditions	progressively	improve	through	(infi-
nite)	 technological	 innovation	 (Strand	et	al.,	 2016).	While	ambiguous	 (Hansson,	2010)	and	
technically	antipodal	 (Gössling	 (2016),	our	study	shows	how	these	seemingly	contradictory	
57	
sustainability	 forms	may	 be	mutually	 supportive:	 the	 former	most	 effectively	 address	 cli-




for	 sustainability.	As	our	 study	observed,	businesses	 such	as	 tour	operators,	which	exploit	
mainly	 generic	 assets	 and	 operate	 under	 uncertain	 climate	 policies,	 tend	 to	maintain	 and	
protect	established	practices	rather	than	enhance	(consumer)	acceptance	of	new	technolo-
gies	(Pinkse	&	Kolk,	2010).	In	such	settings,	niche	innovations	may	be	more	effective	when	
included	 in	 a	broader	policy	mix	 that	 favours	 (integrated)	production	 and	 consumption	of	
green	technologies	(Lachman,	2013;	Pinkse	&	Kolk,	2010).		
Therefore,	 first,	 seeing	 niche	 innovations	 as	 multiplication	 and	 mainstreaming	 processes	
rather	than	blueprints	may	help	increase	the	number	of	experiments,	normalising	the	prac-
tice	of	experimentation	(Brown,	Farrelly,	&	Loorbach,	2013).	Performance	could	be	assessed	
accordingly:	 alongside	 technological	 specifications,	 criteria	may	 cover	 the	 value	 of	 lessons	
learned,	articulation	of	supportive	institutional	requirements,	and	enrolment	of	new	actors	
(Smith	et	al.,	2010).		
Second,	niches	may	perform	better	when	 they	 combine	 technological	 and	 commercial	 ex-
pertise	from	the	start.	Alongside	(scientific)	invention,	niches	need	to	strengthen	the	ability	
of	businesses	to	commercialise	new	technology	by	developing	new	products	and	increasing	















Finally,	this	chapter	 introduces	ANT	to	a	field	where	 it	has	 left	few	traces	but	has	much	to	
offer	 to	 those	 looking	 for	ways	 to	mobilise	 sustainability	 transitions.	 Yet,	 like	 any	 theory,	
ANT	 is	 not	 without	 its	 weaknesses.	 ANT	 jargon	 occasionally	 comes	 across	 as	 inaccessible	


























policy	 processes	 and	 explains	 the	 political	 dimensions	 of	 policymaking.	We	 first	 review	 a	
well-documented	 science-policy	 gap	 in	 sustainable	 tourism	 research	 on	 climate	 change	 to	
























Miller,	 2016;	 Font,	 Higham,	 Miller,	 &	 Pourfakhimi,	 2019).	 Collaboratively	 produced	 and	
properly	 communicated	 scientific	 evidence	 would	 then	 end	 up	 in	 science-based	 policies	




in	 environmental	 policy	 studies	 (see	 e.g.	 Owens,	 Petts,	 &	 Bulkeley,	 2006).	 It	 presupposes	
that	 science	 and	 policy	 share	 universally	 accepted	 definitions	 of	 environmental	 problems	
and	that	the	content	of	policies	is	always	the	focus	(Hajer,	2005).	This	analytical	asymmetry	
disregards	that	the	production	of	policy	and	that	of	science	are	entwined.	Both	domains	are	




in	 policymaking	 (Jasanoff,	 2015).	 An	 alternative	 conceptualisation	 of	 research	 impact	 is	
therefore	relevant.		
Post-structuralist	discourse	 theory	 (hereafter	 referred	 to	as	discourse	 theory)	helps	us	de-
velop	 such	 a	 conceptualisation.	 In	 discourse	 theory	 –	 not	 to	 be	 confused	with	 semiotics-
oriented	 discourse	 analysis	 –	 reality	 is	 a	 discursive	 construct	 (Duineveld	 &	 Van	 Assche,	
2011).	 Discourses	 are	 autonomous	 and	 necessarily	 incomplete	 processes	 of	meaning	 pro-
duction	that	construct	different	versions	of	 reality,	and	that	are	produced	and	reproduced	







tutes	a	discursive	clash	 in	which	no	 form	of	 (scientific)	knowledge	has	direct	access	 to	 the	
truth	(Jasanoff,	2015).	Rather	than	believing	that	universally	accepted	scientific	definitions	of	
environmental	problems	will	bridge	science-policy	gaps,	discourse	theory	allows	us	to	trace	
how	 policy	 actors	 assimilate	 (the	 same)	 scientific	 evidence	 in	 different	 discourses	 (Hajer,	
2005).		
Discourse	theory	thus	exposes	the	power-knowledge	interactions	integral	to	environmental	














Discourse	 theory	 assumes	 that	 reality	 is	 constructed	 through	 the	 interplay	 of	 power	 and	
knowledge	 (Howarth,	2000).	Power,	 in	Foucault’s	view,	 is	an	amoral	and	 relational	 “multi-
plicity	of	force	relations”	operative	everywhere	(Foucault,	1998,	in	Duineveld	&	Van	Assche,	
2011,	p.	81).	Knowledge,	in	contrast,	is	never	neutral.	Knowledge	enhances	power	relations.	
No	 form	 of	 knowledge	 is	 fully	 disconnected	 from	 the	 organisations,	 communities,	 topics,	











analytical	asymmetries.	The	 first	one	relates	 to	 the	particular	scientific	scope	 in	which	this	
literature	 presents	 the	 desirable	 (decarbonised)	 transport	 futures	 it	 advocates.	 These	 fu-
tures,	it	suggests,	require	technocratic	policies	firmly	embedded	in	IPCC	climate	risk	frames	
(Peeters,	Higham,	Cohen,	Eijgelaar,	&	Gössling,	2019),	 in	which	policy	requires	global	man-
agement	 (Oels,	2013).	They	 involve	“structural	 transitions”	 (Cohen	et	al.,	2016,	p.	327),	 “a	
tourism	sector	emission	management	and	reporting	system”,	and	“a	strategic	policy	frame-
work”	 (Scott,	Gössling,	Hall,	&	Peeters,	 2016a,	p.	 68).	And	 they	are	 identified	 through	 sci-
ence-based	simulations	and	scenarios	(Cohen	et	al.,	2016;	Peeters	et	al.,	2019).	Current	poli-
cies	are	evaluated	based	on	how	effective	they	are	in	achieving	these	desirable	futures	(see	
for	 instance	Scott,	Hall,	&	Gössling,	2016c).	This	 literature,	 thus,	exhibits	a	 strong	belief	 in	
science-based	policymaking	(Font	et	al.,	2019),	based	on	a	particular	science-policy	constel-
lation,	in	which	science	determines	acceptable	(climate)	risk	levels	for	policymakers	and	so-










&	Kantenbacher,	2019),	 and	prevailing	neoliberal	 governance	 structures	 (Gössling	&	Scott,	
2018).	These	statements	reflect	Buckley’s	claim	that	policymakers	mainly	use	information	as	
“means	to	gain,	power,	fame,	or	money”	(Buckley,	2012,	p.	537).	Yet,	in	the	light	of	our	ar-
gument,	 they	 seem	one-sided.	 They	 suggest	 that	 certain	 scientific	 knowledge	has	 intrinsic	
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cal	 innovation,	 are	 exposed	 as	 hoaxes	 and	 myths	 (Peeters,	 Higham,	 Kutzner,	 Cohen,	 &	
Gössling,	 2016).	 This	 asymmetry	obscures	how	different	 forms	of	 knowledge	become	 ‘ob-
jects’	in	strategies	that	policy	actors	wittingly	and	unwittingly	deploy	to	exert	influence	and	
negotiate	risk	 (Duineveld	&	Van	Assche,	2011).	A	more	fine-grained	analysis	of	 their	use	 is	
thus	relevant.	
3.2.1. Research	impact	as	a	process	of	object	formation	
We	 therefore	 argue	 that	 research	 impact	 can	 be	 understood	 as	 a	 process	 of	 object	 for-
mation.	Objects	–	in	our	case,	aviation-induced	climate	change	–	are	pronounced	discursive	
constructs	 that	 feature	 as	 central	 elements	 of	 discourses.	 Examples	 include	 issues,	 topics,	
physical	objects,	 ideas,	and	 ideologies	 (Van	Assche	et	al.,	2014).	Objects	are	never	a	given	
and	always	constructed	(Howarth,	2000).	Object	formation	takes	place	 in	contexts	of	com-
peting	discourses,	where	power	and	knowledge	interact	more	intensively	(Duineveld	&	Van	
Assche,	 2011).	 As	 illustrated	 above,	 STR	on	 climate	 change	has	 handed	policymakers	 new	
objects	 as	 arguments,	most	 notably	 ‘health’	 (e.g.	 Cohen	&	 Kantenbacher,	 2019).	 Like	 the	
knowledge	that	created	them,	none	of	 these	objects	 is	politically	neutral.	As	objects	 form,	








et	 al.	 (2014),	 pathways	 entail	 the	 temporal	 dimensions	 of	 policy	 processes	 and	 comprise	
dependencies	 on	 the	 past	 (path	 dependencies),	 present	 (interdependencies),	 and	 future	
(goal	 dependencies).	 The	 past,	 in	 the	 shape	 of	 various	 legacies	 (i.e.	 previous	 policies,	 in-
grained	 governance	 habits	 and	 incumbent	 actors)	 informs	 a	 shared	 understanding	 of	 the	
present.	 In	 the	 present,	 there	 is	 interdependence	 between	 policy	 actors	 and	 institutions	
whose	authority	 relies	on	commitments	 to	current	policies,	 such	as	electoral	and	business	
interests.	 For	 the	 future,	 shared	 visions,	 for	 instance,	 steer	 policy	 directions	 and	 define	
which	actors	take	part	in	policy	processes.	In	sum,	under	these	conditions,	policy	actors	can-
not	 freely	 change	directions.	 By	highlighting	 the	 temporal	 dimensions	of	 policy	 processes,	
pathways,	 thus,	 enable	us	 to	 identify	 the	dependencies	 that	hold	back	 change	 in	environ-
mental	policy	struggles.		








and	 different	 discourse	 coalitions	 can	manifest	 themselves	 in	 a	 single	 actor,	 e.g.	 coalition	
governments.	 Consequently,	 by	 identifying	 sites	 in	 environmental	 policy	 struggles,	we	 can	




(Duineveld	 &	 Van	 Assche,	 2011).	 Actors	 sometimes	 intentionally	 and	 strategically	 deploy	
techniques,	but	often	techniques	are	unintended,	emergent	effects	of	interactions	between	
66	
actors	 (Van	 Assche	 et	 al.	 (2014).	 Six	 techniques	 of	 object	 formation	 are	 distinguished	
(Duineveld	&	Van	Assche,	2011):	 initially,	 the	presence	of	 the	object	 is	 generally	accepted	
but	 viewed	 as	 inconsequential	 (reification),	 before	 problems	 arise	 and	 it	 is	 perceived	 as	










the	 2000s	 (notably	 Gössling,	 2002).	 Yet,	 that	 autumn,	 the	 thesis	 attracted	 substantial	 na-
tional	 media	 coverage.	 In	 Dutch	 aviation	 policymaking,	 an	 environmental	 policy	 struggle	







nature	 of	 research	 impact	 within	 the	 temporal	 dimensions	 of	 policy	 evolutions	 (Boaz,	
Fitzpatrick,	&	Shaw,	2009).		
The	case	study	design	encompassed	three	components	(I-III),	premised	on	Hajer’s	(2005,	p.	









action	 group	directors	 and	 senior	 advisors;	 and	one	 senior	 aviation	 expert)	 to	 discern	 im-
portant	moments	and	the	different	settings	of	the	debate,	as	well	as	ways	 in	which	actors	
influenced	the	debate	(II).	Informants	were	thus	selected	using	a	combination	of	purposive	








on	 the	 condition	of	 anonymity.	 All	 respondents	were	 contacted	by	 phone	or	 email.	 Inter-




ogies	 (comprising	 the	 key	moments,	 policy	 settings,	 and	means	 of	 exerting	 influence	 that	
each	 respondent	 perceived);	 (ii)	 data	 triangulation	 by	 comparing	 these	 chronologies	 with	
newspaper	articles,	reports,	letters	to	parliament,	parliamentary	motions	and	websites;	and	













Historically,	 in	 the	Netherlands,	 the	 object	 of	 aviation-induced	 climate	 change	was	 recog-
nised,	 but	 considered	 irrelevant	 to	 national	 aviation	 policy	 (reification).	 The	 government	
treated	it	as	a	global	policy	item,	which	they	addressed	through	the	International	Civil	Avia-
tion	Organisation	(ICAO)	and	the	European	Union	(Huijs,	2011;	VVD,	CDA,	D66,	&	CU,	2017).	
Like	 France,	Germany,	 and	 the	United	Kingdom,	 the	Netherlands	 –	 densely	 populated,	 in-
creasingly	urbanised	–	is	home	to	one	of	Europe’s	global	aviation	hubs:	Schiphol	airport.	But	
unlike	Paris	Charles	de	Gaulle,	Frankfurt	airport,	and	London	Heathrow,	Schiphol	 is	dispro-
portionally	 large	 compared	 to	 its	 national	 catchment	 area	 (de	 Jong	&	Boelens,	 2014).	We	
identified	a	series	of	past	policies	–	spanning	three	decades	and	revolving	around	the	ques-
tion	of	how	to	develop	and	maintain	a	competitive	global	aviation	hub	when	space	is	limited	




It	owns	and	operates	 the	national	 airport	 Schiphol	 and	 several	 regional	 airports,	 including	











of	 very	 large	 air-	 or	 seaports	 as	 engines	 of	 economic	 growth.	 Growth	 strategies	 between	




Gradually,	 this	 public-private	 partnership	 institutionalised	 as	 an	 ‘iron	 triangle’:	 Schiphol,	
KLM,	I&W	developed	a	governance	habit	of	jointly	preparing	and	taking	decisions,	with	the	
government	 relying	 heavily	 on	 aviation	 sector	 information	 (Huijs,	 2011).	 The	 triangle	 has	
since	functioned	as	a	site	and	cultivated	a	common	discourse	that	focused	on	Schiphol’s	na-
tional	economic	importance,	which	facilitated	hub	expansion.		






























never	 legislated.	 The	 selectivity	 rule	 possibly	 conflicted	with	 European	Union	 competition	
rules,	 which	 Alders	 (2008)	 acknowledged,	 and	 the	 proposed	move	 of	 leisure	 and	 budget	






These	 decisions	 and	 events	 constitute	 a	 history	 of	 steering	 attempts	 (Van	 Assche	 et	 al.,	
2014):	a	pathway	of	(past)	policy	commitments	to	hub	expansion	in	the	face	of	environmen-






















and	 Infrastructure	 (RLI),	 a	 strategic	 advisory	 board	 of	 the	 government,	 published	 Beyond	
Mainports,	 concluding	 that	 Schiphol	 was	 not	 a	major	 economic	 driver	 (Rli,	 2016).	 ‘Noise’	
gained	momentum.	The	‘mainport’s’	fall	from	grace	had	begun.		
Second,	 aviation	 became	 a	 topic	 on	 the	 national	 political	 agenda.	 Parliamentary	 elections	
took	place	in	March	2017.	The	Green	Party	scored	well	and	initially	participated	in	coalition	
talks,	but	eventually	joined	the	opposition.	After	the	elections,	they	selected	aviation	as	one	
of	 their	main	 topics,	as	 the	 lack	of	 realistic	 technological	mitigation	solutions	 legitimised	a	






Third,	 a	 new	 actor	 emerged	 and	 entered	 the	 policy	 arena.	 In	 2017,	 the	 Lelystad	 situation	
escalated.	The	government	had	already	postponed	the	airport’s	opening	due	to	flight	rout-




ties	 under	 these	 (new)	 flight	 paths.	 Resident	 action	 groups	 formed.	 One	 of	 them	 (Hoo-
gOverIJssel)	 had	members	with	 in-depth	 technical	 expertise	 of	 aviation	 and	 knew	 how	 to	
engage	with	media	and	politicians.	The	group	analysed	Lelystad’s	Environmental	Impact	As-
sessment	(EIA),	and	reached	out	to	MPs	and	the	media,	claiming	the	anticipated	noise	levels	



























The	 environmental	NGOs	now	had	 their	 pretext.	 They	 entered	 the	unfolding	debate	 from	
that	autumn	onwards.	International	NGO	Transport	&	Environment	(T&E)	launched	an	inter-
national	lobby	campaign	in	countries	dealing	with	aviation	controversies.	In	the	Netherlands,	












–	 entwined	 in	 the	 Dutch	 aviation	 policy	 process.	 The	 object	 of	 aviation-induced	 climate	
change,	considered	international	policy	matter	up	until	that	point,	correspondingly	emerged	











climate	 change	grew	 steadily	 (see	 Figure	3-1).	N&M,	Greenpeace,	 and	MNH	exploited	 the	
public	discontent,	which,	in	part,	they	had	helped	create.	They	organised	meet-ups,	sympo-
sia	 and	 rallies.	With	 the	help	of	 green	alliance	MPs,	 the	NGOs	helped	action	 groups	build	
nation-wide	platforms.	The	Collaborating	Action	Groups	Against	Low-level	flight	paths	(SATL)	
and	 a	 national	 citizens’	 council	 against	 aviation	 growth	 (LBBL)	 were	 subsequently	 estab-

























technological	 challenge	 entwined	with	 pro-growth	 globalism	 and	 national	 pride.	 Together	
with	KLM,	Schiphol	is	portrayed	as	an	icon	of	the	Netherlands	as	a	trading	nation.	Zero	avia-
tion	growth	is	postulated	as	pointless	because	of	current	global	growth	projections.	Growth	
is	presented	as	a	condition	 to	develop	new	technologies	 that	 reduce	emissions.	There	are	





The	sector	 is	presented	as	 lacking	meaningful	climate	action	while	being	 largely	exempted	
from	tax;	policies	should	therefore	apply	the	‘polluter	pays’	principle.			
In	the	unfolding	discursive	conflict,	we	observed	different	strategies	for	exerting	 influence.	
We	 identified	 ‘commissioned	 results’,	 i.e.	 the	 commissioning	of	 independent	 (commercial)	
research	 agencies	 to	 generate	 science-based	 counter-evidence	 to	 increase	 credibility	 (see	
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ing	 debate	 jeopardised	 the	 position	 of	 the	 new	 Minister	 of	 Infrastructure,	 Van	 Nieu-






regarding	 noise	 dropped	 (see	 Figure	 3-1).	 Responsibility	 for	 aviation	was	moved	 from	 the	
State	Secretary	to	the	Minister.	Early	2018,	a	new	Director	General	(Dronkers)	was	appoint-




and	marked	 conciliator,	 adjusting	 the	 airport’s	 tone	 to	moderate,	 conditional	 growth.	 To	
take	the	sting	out	of	the	opposition’s	arguments,	the	minister	promised	parliament	regular	
updates	 on	 the	 efforts	 of	 the	 aviation	 sector	 to	 reduce	 emissions	 (van	 Nieuwenhuizen-
Wijbenga,	 2019).	 This	 promise	 led	 to	 the	 sustainable	 aviation	 Climate	 Agreement	 sub-
platform.	
February	 2018,	 the	 government	 started	 five	 ‘Climate	 Agreement	 sectorial	 platforms’	 that	
were	to	formulate	proposals	on	how	to	achieve	the	2030	CO2	target	and	contribute	to	a	Na-
tional	 Climate	 Agreement.	 I&W	was	 responsible	 for	 the	 platform	 on	mobility.	 As	 aviation	
was	not	 included	 in	this	platform	(in	accordance	with	the	Paris	Agreement),	Dronkers	per-
suaded	the	sector	to	establish	a	sustainable	aviation	sub-platform	aimed	at	achieving	emis-
sion	 reductions.	 He	 chaired	 the	 sub-platform	 himself	 but	 lacked	 formal	 (legal)	 means	 to	
move	the	sector	forward	in	terms	of	climate	action.	To	put	pressure	on	the	sector,	he	invited	
N&M	 –	 as	 a	 respected	 environmental	 NGO	 –	 to	 join	 (also	 on	 behalf	 of	 Greenpeace	 and	
MNH).	In	June	2018,	the	sub-platform	met	for	the	first	time.	
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optimism:	 they	showcase	new	technologies	 like	electric	and	 futuristic	aircraft	designs,	and	
link	these	to	claims	of	significant	future	emission	reductions	(see	the	rise	of	both	technology	


















organisations	 and	 plans	 (institutionalisation)	 and	 placed	 the	 object	 firmly	 in	 the	 realm	 of	
technological	innovation.	
Storm	impact	
It	 is	 too	 early	 to	 pinpoint	 the	 storm’s	 definitive	 impact.	 However,	 the	 object	 of	 aviation-
induced	climate	change	had	by	now	become	a	central	policy	 item	 in	Dutch	aviation;	more	









hub	development	 is	a	 full-blown	political	problem.	March	2020,	 the	status	 is	 that	 the	gov-
ernment	intends	to	open	Lelystad	in	November	2020,	at	the	earliest.		
Arguably,	 I&W,	too,	 lost	political	 leverage.	 In	November	2018,	parliament	passed	a	motion	
that	opened	 the	debate	on	aviation	 tax	and	encouraged	 the	government	 to	build	 interna-
tional	 support	 for	an	 international	kerosene	 tax	as	a	mechanism	to	encourage	sustainable	
aviation	fuels.	In	May	2019,	the	Ministry	of	Finance	announced	its	pursuit	of	an	international	




























offered	 the	 environmental	movement	 the	 opportunity	 to	 join	 the	 debate.	 A	 new	national	
policy	pathway	subsequently	opened,	scrutinising	Schiphol,	 its	politics	of	growth,	and	avia-
tion	at	 large	 for	 its	 climate	 impact.	 The	Dutch	aviation	policy	 status	quo	had	become	em-
blematic	 of	 the	 global	 climate	 crisis	 and	 the	 subject	 of	 environmental	 politics	 (cf.	 Hajer,	
2005).	






fending	 the	 status	quo,	again	attempted	 to	make	 their	business	 strategies	part	of	govern-
ment	policy,	reflected	in	the	draft	covenant	for	sustainable	aviation	(ACN	et	al.,	2019).	Both	













and	 commissioned	 results,	 respectively).	 Yet,	 while	 the	 future	 claims	 produced	 in	 science	
serve	the	future	and	expose	the	past	and	present	(Scott	et	al.,	2016c),	the	future	claims	pro-
duced	 in	 the	 policy	 domain	 generally	 serve	 economic	 and	 electoral	 interests.	 In	 our	 case,	










sembled	 decentralised	 forms	 of	 Poldermodel	 decision-making	 (Vogelij,	 2015).	 Although	
seemingly	open	negotiations	between	actors	with	different	interests,	they	resembled	what	
Jasanoff	(2002,	p.	268)	described	as	pre-scripted	forms	of	group	interactions	that	“perpetu-
ate	existing	hierarchies”.	Their	 creation	–	or	maintenance	–	 tends	 to	make	discourses	and	
discourse	coalitions	more	pronounced.	In	this	study,	science	played	an	important	role	in	this	
process:	the	two	discourse	coalitions	that	emerged	across	these	sites	used	science	to	exert	
influence.	 Thus,	 in	 environmental	 policy	 struggles,	 research	 impact	 comprises	 conflicting	
policy	actions	and	reactions.	This	disparity	seems	to	grow	over	time	and	is	arguably	exacer-
bated	by	the	continuous	deployment	of	(commissioned)	research.	
The	different	 techniques	of	object	 formation	we	observed	 in	our	case	study	underline	 this	
disparity.	 All	 contenders	 used	 science	 to	 bolster	 truth	 claims	 and	 undermine	 competing	
ones.	According	to	Weingart	(1999),	such	science-politics	erodes	scientific	authority	because	
it	forces	policymakers	to	make	decisions	based	on	contradictory	advice.	In	these	situations,	
science	 produces	 knowledge	 objects	 that	 function	 as	 “repositories	 of	 power”	 (Jasanoff,	
2002,	p.	253).	These	objects	present	temporary	certainties	in	the	face	of	uncertainty.	This	is	




This	 object	 “legitimises	 the	 practice	 of	 statecraft”	 (Jasanoff,	 2002,	 p.	 257),	 as	 established	
hierarchies	 associate	 themselves	 with	 (concepts	 of)	 novel	 technologies	 to	 reinforce	 their	
positions	(see	Figure	3-2).	Accordingly,	in	environmental	policy	struggles,	research	impact	is	

















mann,	 1990,	 in	 Beck,	 2009;	 Oels,	 2013).	 Consequently,	 as	 discursive	 gaps	 can	 never	 be	
closed	(Van	Assche	et	al.,	2014),	what	remains	 is	a	field	of	profound	cultural	politics;	a	de-
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in	which	policymakers	have	 to	negotiate	 conflicting	 science-based	 truth	 claims,	 and	 select	




importance	 of	 persuasive	 science	 communication	 and	 engagement	with	 policy	 actors:	 the	
PhD	 press	 release	was	well-timed	 and	 Peeters	 qualified	 as	 a	 convincing	 communicator	 of	
science	 (see	 Peters,	 2008).	 But,	 above	 all,	 it	 illustrated	 the	 importance	 of	 steadfastness.	










intricate	 force	 field,	 examine	 environmental	 policy	 struggles	 from	 up-close	 and	 within	
(Jasanoff,	2015),	and	in	different	governance	contexts.	To	avoid	the	analytical	asymmetries	
that	emerge	when	a	single	environmental	reality	is	pitched	against	policy	rhetoric,	environ-







Abstract	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 				
This	 chapter	 studies	 the	 productive	 role	 of	 innovation	 in	 organisations.	 Using	 the	 post-






resulted	 in	a	new	version	of	 this	 innovation	unit	 that	 strengthened	established	actors	and	
institutions	within	the	organisation.	Our	study	shows	how	the	use	of	the	concept	of	innova-























later,	 facing	 a	 global	 pandemic	 and	 related	 market	 challenges,	 German	 government-
provided	financial	stabilisation	packages	worth	€2.0bn	are	keeping	the	“the	world’s	leading	








can	 be	 very	 relevant,	 but	 it	 shrouds	 the	 complexities	 inherent	 to	 innovation	 from	within	
(Akrich,	Callon,	&	Latour,	2002a).		
Even	when	they	want	to,	established	organisations	like	Thomas	Cook	and	TUI	cannot	easily	
change	directions.	Various	dependencies,	 such	as	past	 accomplishments,	 current	 routines,	







vation	 (see	e.g.	 Smith,	Ree,	&	Murray,	2016).	 Innovation	 can	 introduce	 risks	 that	 compro-






research	 (see	Pikkemaat,	Peters,	&	Bichler,	2019	 for	 the	 latest	 review),	 a	 sizeable	body	of	
literature	 addresses	 the	 innovativeness	 of	 tourism	 organisations	 (see	 e.g.	 Fraj,	Matute,	 &	
Melero,	2015;	Kallmuenzer	&	Peters,	2018;	Martínez-Román,	Tamayo,	Gamero,	&	Romero,	
2015;	 Tajeddini,	 2010).	 In	 this	 literature,	 organisations	 are	 unquestioningly	 understood	 as	
‘firms’,	 distinct	 constructs	 separable	 from	 their	 performance	 (Guérard,	 Langley,	 &	 Seidl,	




In	contrast	to	these	 instrumentalist	approaches,	 interpretivist	approaches	consider	 innova-
tion	a	dynamic	process	in	different	organisational	settings	(see	e.g.	Lowe,	Williams,	&	Shaw	
et	 al.,	 2012;	 Nordin	 &	 Hjalager,	 2017;	 Smith	 et	 al.,	 2016;	 Rodriguez-Sanchez,	Williams,	 &	
Brotons,	2019;	Zhang,	Kimbu,	&	Lin	et	al.,	2020).	Innovation	is	seen	as	the	progressive	entre-
preneurial	or	 intrapreneurial	achievement	of	 creative	and	knowledgeable	persons	collabo-
rating	 in	 teams,	 self-organising	networks,	 or	 coalitions.	 The	 focus	 is	 on	 the	perspective	of	
these	 individuals	 to	 identify	or	understand	different	antecedents	 that	can	explain	their	ac-
tions	and	the	resulting	innovations.	








or	 concept	 of	 innovation	 itself	 also	 accumulates	 an	 agency	 of	 some	 kind	 remains	 un-
addressed	in	these	two	bodies	of	literature.	Through	its	presence	and	use	in	organisations,	






porate	 tour	 operators,	 despite	 their	 substantial	 role	 in	 shaping	 the	 international	 tourism	
industry.	As	part	of	the	TUI	Group,	TUI	Benelux	is	a	cluster	organisation	of	TUI	Netherlands	





studies	 of	 innovation,	 sensitive	 to	 the	more	 political	 uses	 of	 the	 concept	 of	 innovation	 in	
organisations	(Kooij	et	al.,	2012):	post-structuralist	organisation	and	governance	theory	(Van	
Assche,	Beunen,	Duineveld,	&	Gruzbacher,	2020;	Van	Assche	et	al.,	2014;	Czarniawska,	2009;	
2004;	1998;	Kooij	et	al.,	2012).	Two	 interrelated	 ideas	shape	 the	 theoretical	 framework	of	
this	study:	open	concepts	and	performativity.	Open	concepts	are	seemingly	vague	concepts	








































Performativity	 highlights	 that	 the	 discursive	 use	 of	 the	 concept	 of	 innovation	 in	 organisa-
tional	practices	can	be	productive	in	itself,	regardless	of	the	value	attached	to	the	outcomes.	
The	‘innovative’	ideas	produced	within	an	organisation	can	result	in	the	emergence	of	new	
actors	 and	 institutions,	 resistance,	 and	 altered	 patterns	 of	 inclusion	 and	 exclusion	 of	








resentations	 of	 the	 organisation.	 As	 innovation	 can	 assume	 various	 shapes,	 the	 concept	
evokes	different	 understandings	of	 an	organisation’s	 past,	 present,	 and	 future,	 and	 corre-
sponding	 tensions	 and	 conflicts	 (Van	 Assche	 et	 al.,	 2020).	 Innovation	 can	 confront	 actors	
with	 their	 own	 conflicting	 loyalties,	 i.e.	 to	 direct	 colleagues,	 the	 organisation,	 clients,	 and	
their	personal	networks,	even	within	a	single	project	or	practice	(Grabher,	2004).	This	multi-
plicity	 highlights	 that	 innovation	 can	 stimulate	divergences	 in	organisational	 practices.	 Ra-




organisational	 routines,	 for	 instance	through	gradual	 institutionalisation	of	new	 ideas	 (Van	
Assche	 et	 al.,	 2014).	 Flexible	 interpretation	 accommodates	 the	 co-existence	 of	 different	
meanings	and	interpretations	of	innovation	and	its	organisation	(Kooij	et	al.,	2012).	This	can	
enable	actors	to	buy	more	time,	mask	their	intentions,	and/or	avoid	conflict	in	the	process	
of	mobilising	support	 for	their	 ideas	(Van	Assche	et	al.,	2014).	Such	competitions	for	 influ-
ence	can	create	convergences	in	organisational	practices.	Actors	are	necessarily	required	to	
find	 broader	 strategic	 acceptance	 of	 their	 positions.	Mobilising	 support	 through	 coalition	











The	 case-study	method	 is	 deemed	 suitable	 for	 exploring	 less	 accessible,	 unique	 organisa-
tional	practices	(see	Tasci,	Wei,	&	Milman	2020).		
Our	case	–	the	development	of	an	innovation	unit	in	TUI	Benelux	–	consisted	of	a	collection	





&	 Tribe,	 2016).	 Its	 integrated	 process	 of	 data	 generation	 and	 analysis	 granted	 us	 the	 re-
quired	mobility	and	flexibility	in	the	field	(see	Czarniawska,	2004):	the	possibility	to	change	




for	 a	 reflection	 (and	 learned	 about	 the	 unit’s	 re-emergence).	We	 generated	 data	 through	







Alongside,	we	 interviewed	members	of	 the	organisation	directly	 and	 indirectly	 involved	 in	
the	development	of	the	 innovation	unit	 (see	table	4-2).	We	used	these	 interviews	to	trace	
interpretations	of	this	process	as	 informants	reflected	on	–	and	made	sense	of	–	what	had	








learned,	and	complemented	data	generation.	 Inherent	 to	our	 iterative	approach,	 respond-
ents	were	selected	using	a	combination	of	purposive	and	snowball	 sampling	 (see	Beard	et	



































Design	sprint	innovation	team	 Innovation	team	 3	days	 06-02-2018	to	08-02-2018	






















In	 this	study	we	had	very	useful	access	 to	key	 informants.	The	participating	TUI	staff	have	
been	helpful,	welcoming,	and	open	to	discuss	 issues	during	 interviews	and	 innovation	unit	
events.	Overall,	the	applied	techniques	enabled	us	to	identify	and	follow	the	evolution	of	the	
innovation	unit.	 Yet,	 regardless	of	 the	duration	of	 fieldwork	and	 the	 techniques	deployed,	
access	is	always	precarious	and	partial	(Czarniawska,	1998).	In	the	field,	we	positioned	our-
selves	as	researchers.	Despite	being	overt	about	our	role,	we	sporadically	got	the	impression	




guments	 that	 further	 legitimised	 –	 or	 delegitimised	 –	 aspired	 courses	 of	 action	 (see	 Czar-
niawska,	 2001).	 Related,	 organisational	 hierarchies	 and	 pecking	 orders	 arguably	 confined	










vant	data	 to	 identify	 the	aggregated	sequence	of	events	constituting	 the	 innovation	unit’s	
evolution;	and	(iii)	we	used	combinations	of	initial	and	focused	coding	(see	Charmaz,	2014)	
to	detect	multiple,	evolving	interpretations	of	TUI,	innovation	(within	TUI),	and	the	innova-


















ny’s	main	 tour	operator.	Preussag	changed	 its	name	 to	TUI	 in	2002	and	has	developed	 its	




































ther	 than	 a	 business	 incubator	 independently	 pursuing	 new	 business	 opportunities	 (see	
Gonthier	&	Chirita,	2019;	O’Reilly	III	&	Tushman,	2004).	It	would	identify	and	centralise	the	
different	 innovation	 initiatives	 in	 the	organisation	 (R10;	R11).	A	senior	manager	 (hereafter	
referred	 to	as	C.)	was	assigned	 to	coordinate	 this	process,	and	 form	an	 interdepartmental	
team.		
4.4.2. The	evolution	of	an	innovation	unit	in	TUI	Benelux	
On	9	August	2017,	 fifteen	TUI	Benelux	staff	members	received	an	email	 from	C.	 informing	

















and	 external	 needs.	 This	 sparked	 unease	 among	 the	 participants.	 A	 discussion	 started,	 in	
which	the	idea	of	the	innovation	team	got	entangled	with	various	operational	concerns.	Par-
ticipants	expressed	unease	about	the	board	controlling	the	projects,	the	additional	work	on	
top	 of	 their	 regular	 jobs,	 the	 organisation’s	 culture,	 and	possible	 friction	with	 operational	
and	sales	targets.	C.	tried	to	calm	everybody	down	by	proposing	that	the	attendees	would	






This	 time,	nine	TUI	 staff	 (seven	had	also	participated	 in	 the	kick-off)	 and	another	external	
expert	(an	agile	business	consultant)	gathered	in	a	room	decorated	with	pre-drawn	flipchart	
papers.	C.,	who	again	 led	 the	meeting,	had	opted	 for	a	more	directive	approach.	C.	 intro-
duced	 (a	 flipchart	with	 a	 drawing	 of)	 ‘the	 innovation	 engine’	 (Figure	 4-1).	 This	 innovation	
engine,	which	C.	had	developed	earlier	with	the	help	of	the	agile	business	consultant,	was	a	
generic	 innovation	process	 based	on	Cooper’s	 (2011)	 stage-gate	model.	 The	 engine’s	 pur-
pose,	C.	explained,	was	to	put	something	in	and	to	get	something	out.	The	innovation	engine	
consisted	of	 four	different	silos.	The	 innovation	team	was	supposed	to	staff	 the	engine.	 In	















whether	 it	 was	 feasible	 to	 complete	 one	 ‘innovation’	 within	 the	 proposed	 three-month	








There	was	discussion	about	 vision,	 scope,	 and	KPIs.	About	what	 the	engine	 should	deliver	
and	what	it	should	not	deliver.	The	engine’s	innovations	had	not	yet	been	defined.	Yet,	there	
was	 consensus	 that	 TUI	was	 an	 organisation	 that	 celebrated	 success	 and	 results	 first	 and	



















ing	 was	 planned	 in	 December	 2017.	 Eight	 TUI	 staff	 participated.	 Initially,	 there	 was	 little	





The	design	 sprint	 took	place	 from	6	 to	8	February	2018.	Nine	TUI	 staff	were	present.	The	
external	facilitator	asked	the	team	to	do	various	assignments,	including	goal-setting	exercis-
es	and	customer	interview	role	plays.	They	had	to	develop	a	pitch	and	sell	their	ideas	to	the	





of	PMO’s	priority	 list.	C.	acknowledged	that,	at	PMO,	 ‘must	have’	comes	first,	and	 ‘nice	to	
have’	second,	and	said	PMO	would	be	difficult	to	convince.	They	also	knew	they	could	not	

















Over	 summer,	 C.	 looked	 into	 design	 thinking	 techniques	 and	 took	 a	 change	management	
course.	A	consultancy	firm	was	hired	to	restructure	C.’s	department	and	to	 jointly	develop	
an	 innovation	 programme	 that	would	 organise	 ‘real’	 innovation	 in	 TUI	 Benelux.	 This	 pro-











centric	 products.	 The	 fifth	pillar,	 ‘the	 sandbox’,	was	 about	playing:	 experimenting	without	
clear	targets,	for	instance	with	new	technologies.	By	making	their	own	work	processes	more	






innovation	head	with	a	background	 in	business	and	 innovation	 rather	 than	 ICT.	 In	 January	
2019,	C.	 joined	 the	TUI	Benelux	board.	By	 June	2019,	C.	managed	a	 team	of	 fifteen.	Most	
staff	were	new	hires;	none	of	them	had	participated	in	the	innovation	team.	‘Process	excel-
lence’	was	added	to	the	department’s	existing	tasks	of	‘business	development’	and	‘innova-








vation	 emerged,	 through	discussions	 about	 innovation	 and	 the	 innovation	 unit,	 and	 there	
was	no	consensus	on	its	meaning	(cf.	Kooij	et	al.,	2012).		
In	 the	 board,	 some	depicted	 it	 as	 an	 integral	 aspect	 of	 daily	 operations	 (R11),	 and	 talked	
about	a	constant	collective	process	of	 implementing	 incremental	 improvements	 that,	over	
time,	enabled	the	company	to	thrive.	Others	represented	it	as	a	means	to	advance	strategy	
(R10).	 Innovation	 could	 comprise	 anything	 new,	 provided	 it	 fitted	 the	 strategy.	 And	 there	




lems.	Once	addressed,	 there	would	be	 success,	 in	 the	 shape	of	 (more)	 growth,	 relevance,	







streamline	 idea	uptake	 in	support	of	TUI’s	corporate	strategy.	But	during	 the	August	2017	
kick-off	meeting,	rather	than	mapping	existing	ideas	in	the	organisation,	attendees	ranked	a	
selection	of	 individually	prepared	problem	statements.	 Those	with	an	 interest	 in	 changing	



























































Others	 felt	 that	 TUI	missed	 a	method	 to	 systematically	 learn	 from	mistakes.	 According	 to	







These	 tensions	 and	 conflicts	 –	 confronting	 innovation	 team	members	with	 their	own	 con-
flicting	loyalties	(cf.	Grabher,	2004)	–	revealed	discontent	with	the	functioning	of	the	organi-
sation.	From	April	2018	onwards,	 some	of	 this	discontent	created	a	 ‘burning	platform’	 for	














































into	 a	 new	 narrative,	 in	which	 the	 innovation	 unit	 re-emerged,	 this	 time	 renamed	 as	 the	
‘employee	 journey’.	 The	 engine	 metaphor	 and	 its	 mechanical,	 impersonal,	 and	 product-
oriented	 connotations	 gave	way	 to	 an	 emphasis	 on	 inclusive	 employee	development.	 The	
focus	had	moved	from	solving	problems	to	fostering	talent	while	achieving	efficiency	gains:	




The	 narrative	 of	 the	 ‘employee	 journey’	was	 subsequently	 used	 to	 create	 leverage	 for	 an	
integrated	innovation	approach	in	TUI	Benelux.	It	downplayed	the	importance	of	the	innova-














The	 ‘employee	 journey’	 aided	 coalition	 building	 (cf.	 Nordin	 &	 Hjalager,	 2017;	 Rodriguez-




In	this	chapter	we	examined	the	productive	role	of	 innovation	 in	a	 large	tourism	organisa-
tion	(TUI).	Our	study	showed	that	in	this	organisation	innovation	is	subject	to	many	interpre-
tations	and	definitions.	These	 ‘misunderstandings’	about	 innovation	 initially	created	a	self-
perceived	failure	as	it	generated	tensions	and	conflicts	typical	of	efficiency-driven	organisa-
tional	cultures	(see	Doz	&	Kosonen,	2010).	 It	also	enhanced	reflexivity	within	the	organisa-
tion	by	highlighting	different	 forms	of	discontent	with	 the	 functioning	of	 the	organisation,	
including	doubts	and	speculations	about	TUI’s	future,	corporate	strategy,	and	its	implemen-
tation.	 Some	 forms	 of	 organisational	 discontent	 operated	 as	 ‘known	unknowns’	 that	 staff	
were	generally	aware	of	but	did	not	directly	communicate	to	management.	Other	forms	of	
organisational	 discontent	were	 part	 of	 an	 implicit	 knowledge	within	 the	 organisation	 that	
foregrounded	when	the	innovation	unit	was	being	set	up	and	people	discussed	innovation.	
The	different	forms	of	discontent	made	the	structural	limits	of	innovation	in	the	organisation	
explicit.	 Posed	 as	 barriers	 to	 innovation	 (cf.	 Rodgriguez-Sanchez	 et	 al.,	 2019),	 they	 func-






tions	 and	 actors	 (cf.	 Kooij	 et	 al.,	 2012).	 In	 other	words,	 ‘doing	 innovation’	 simultaneously	
undermined	and	stimulated	innovativeness	in	this	organisation,	thereby	demonstrating	the	
paradox	of	innovation	(Bontems,	2014).	On	the	one	hand,	the	discursive	presence	of	innova-
tion	 in	 organisational	 practices	 generated	 fundamentally	 different	 understandings	 of	 the	




phase	or	 task	 than	can	be	delimited	and	planned	 in	 the	 innovation	process	 (cf.	Rodriguez-
Sanchez	et	al.,	2019),	but	is	inherent	to	the	use	of	the	concept	in	organisations.	
4.6.1. The	productive	role	of	innovation	














uting	 to	and	at	 the	same	time	diverging	 from	these	bodies	of	 literature,	we	examined	the	
possibility	 that	 the	 concept	 of	 innovation,	 through	 its	 presence	 and	 use	 in	 organisational	
practices,	also	accrues	agency.		
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Our	 study	 showed	 that	 the	 concept	 of	 innovation	 served	 as	 an	 open	 concept	 to	 ‘store’	 a	
multiplicity	 of	 interpretations.	 This	 makes	 innovation	 not	 only	 an	 attractive	management	
idea,	but	also	a	political	device	in	organisations	(Czarniawska,	2008).	Strategising	actors	op-
erating	under	 the	 innovation	banner	can	pursue	different	goals	as	 they	turn	circulating	 in-
terpretations	 into	 productive	 narratives	 and	 mobilise	 support	 for	 their	 agendas,	 without	
disclosing	 the	disparities	 that	would	be	obvious	 if	 the	 innovation	 lexicon	were	more	exact	
(Bontems,	2014).	These	narratives	necessarily	fluctuate	to	maintain	their	function	as	“trigger	
for	 actions	 towards	 goals	 that	 are	 forever	 changing”	 (Garud	 et	 al.,	 2014,	 p.	 1181).	 In	 our	
case,	the	evolving	enactment	of	distinct	organisational	representations	about	the	organisa-









tion	 as	 a	 concept	 for	 the	 creation	 and	 adoption	 of	 novelty	 in	 tourism	 organisations.	We	
therefore	 encourage	 researchers	 measuring	 innovativeness	 to	 treat	 vagueness	 as	 an	 im-
portant	 empirical	 feature	 of	 innovation,	 rather	 than	 as	 a	 definitional	 and	methodological	




neously	 strengthen	 and	 limit	 innovativeness	 in	 organisations.	 They	 can	 turn	 discussions	
about	 innovation	 into	 actual	 innovation,	 or	 its	 opposite.	 Rather	 than	 veiling	 innovation’s	
conceptual	vagueness	with	presupposed	substance	(Van	Assche	et	al.,	2014),	studies	meas-
uring	 innovativeness	 in	organisations,	we	believe,	 should	acknowledge	these	contradictory	
effects.	 Innovativeness	 thus,	 is	 best	observed	as	 an	emergent	effect	 embedded	 in	distinct	
organisational	 practices.	 To	 acknowledge	 this	 specificity,	 studies	 can	 use	more	 proximate	
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(micro-	 or	meso-level)	 performance	 indicators	 (Guérard	 et	 al.,	 2013),	 or	 develop	 context-
specific	indicators	in	collaboration	with	actors	in	the	organisation.		
For	 the	 same	 reason,	 we	 call	 for	 researchers	 examining	 the	 innovation	 process	 to	 fore-
ground	innovation’s	political	dimension	in	their	studies.	Coalition	building,	rather	than	a	pro-
cessual	 stage	or	 task	 that	 can	be	delimited	and	planned	 (cf.	 e.g.	Rodriguez-Sanchez	et	 al.,	
2019),	can	be	viewed	as	integral	to	innovation	itself;	narratives	play	a	prominent	role	in	this	
process	(Garud	et	al.,	2014).	The	accomplishments	that	individuals	describe	when	describing	










comprises	generative	and	transformative	functions	 in	organisation.	Output	 is	an	 important	
aspect	 of	 innovation,	 but	 requires	 and	 results	 from	 divergent	 interpretations	 and	 ideas	
about	 novelty	 and	 its	 limitations	 in	 organisation.	 A	 one-sided	 focus	 on	 output,	 thus,	 risks	










ny’s	 shareholders.	 In	 times	 of	 crisis,	 this	 discourse	 arguably	 gains	 prominence.	 Successful	
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corporate	 venturing	 requires	 top-level	 coordinated	 responses	 to	 secure	 shareholder	 and	
related	executive	 interests.	At	 the	same	time,	 top-down	coordination	and	control	progres-
sively	 limits	 space	 for	 open-dialogue,	 productive	 conflicts	 and	misunderstandings,	 and	 the	
consideration	of	new	ideas.	In	the	case	of	TUI	Benelux,	this	contributed	to	the	rigidities	that	
limit	 the	 kind	of	 innovation	deemed	necessary	by	 those	working	 to	 instigate	 change	 from	
within.	
There	are	various	ways	to	soften	these	rigidities	and	strengthen	the	adaptive	capacities	of	
efficiency-driven	 organisations.	 Reflexivity	 at	 board	 level	 can	 be	 strengthened	 (see	 Doz	&	





















































Innovation	 is	 generally	 framed	positively	 and	often	narrowed	down	 to	 commercialised	 in-
vention.	 This	 interpretation	 is	 largely	 seen	 as	 a	 given:	 explanations	 for	 this	 optimism	 are	
rarely	offered.	This	understanding	of	innovation	is	also	prominent	in	innovation	discourses	in	
the	Dutch	 outbound	 travel	 industry	 and	 in	 the	mainstream	and	 tourism	 innovation	 litera-











1).	Material	 events	 are	 relations	 between	 (a	 particular)	 changing	materiality	 and	 the	 con-
struction	of	interpretations	and	responses	through	distinct	organisational	practices	embed-
ded	 in	different	discourses	 (Duineveld	et	al.,	2017).	The	notion	of	material	events	enabled	





















arguments	 that	 justified	 inertia	 (cf.	Van	Assche	et	al.,	 2014).	Among	 the	 tour	operators	 in	
chapter	2,	these	were	strategic,	ideological,	or	both.	Some	viewed	their	product	as	a	tool	to	
create	positive	impacts	in	(long-haul)	destinations	in	developing	countries	(see	e.g.	Van	Wijk,	
2009):	an	 interpretation	of	 tourism	that	does	not	 sit	easily	with	climate	change	mitigation	





and	 staff	 to	 focus	 on	 operations	 and	 short-term	 results	 rather	 than	 probing	 their	 implicit	













the	heavily	 institutionalised	expansion	politics	of	Dutch	national	 airport	 Schiphol	 and	KLM	
Royal	 Dutch	 Airlines.	 New	 actors	 –	 citizen	 action	 groups	 and	 environmental	 NGOs	 –	 then	
entered	 the	debate.	And	 in	 chapter	4,	an	 initiative	 to	 improve	 idea	uptake	 in	TUI	Benelux	
made	 people	 discuss	 innovation	 in	 the	 organisation	 and	 accentuated	 the	 organisation’s	





nated	 responses.	As	 they	 comprised	distinct	organisational	practices	and	communications,	
they	had	both	material	and	discursive	dimensions.	
In	chapter	2,	reality	effects	constituted	the	different,	changing	and	contradicting	ideas	about	







and	CARMACAL	–	envisioned	as	a	way	 to	address	 the	carbon	 footprint	of	 tour	packages	–	
remained	 a	 passive	 tool,	 subjugated	 to	 the	 established	 business	 routines	 that	 it	was	 sup-
posed	to	transform.		
Similarly,	in	chapter	3,	reality	effects	comprised	an	environmental	policy	struggle	that	began	
to	 unfold	 after	 the	 PhD	 thesis	 had	 reintroduced	 the	 object	 of	 aviation-induced	 climate	
change	 to	 the	Dutch	aviation	policy	process	and	new	actors	had	entered	 the	debate.	Two	
discourse	coalitions	subsequently	emerged	that	represented	the	object	in	different	ways	(cf.	
Hajer,	 2005):	 an	 environmental	 alliance	 presenting	 aviation-induced	 climate	 change	 as	 a	
matter	of	climate	justice	and	institutional	change;	and	a	government-mobilised	industry	alli-
ance	depicting	 the	object	 as	 a	 technological	 challenge	 and	 that	proposed	 their	 Smart	 and	
Sustainable	 Action	 Plan	 as	 a	 solution.	 Among	 different	 tested	 strategies	 of	 exerting	 influ-
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ence,	 actors	 across	 the	 discursive	 spectrum	 used	 the	 method	 of	 ‘commissioned	 results’:	
commission	 scientific	 research	and	use	 the	 resulting	evidence	 to	 construct	objective	 truth	
claims	that	support	one’s	own	position	and	discredit	the	position	of	one’s	opponents.	In	this	
way,	additional	knowledge	objects	were	drawn	 into	 the	discussion,	 including	 the	object	of	




op	 an	 innovation	unit	 in	 TUI	Benelux,	 the	 concept	operated	 as	 an	open	 concept	 that	was	
















actions	 and	 reactions	 took	 the	 form	 of	 projects,	 project	 teams,	 coalitions,	 platforms,	 and	
formalised	 organisations	 that	 functioned	 as	 sites	 (Van	 Assche	 et	 al.,	 2014):	 spaces	where	
actors	 assessed	 joint	 actions	 and	 coordinated	 different,	 collective	 responses.	 Innovation	
constitutes	these	sites	and	the	resulting	aggregated	actions	and	their	outcomes.	As	the	case	
studies	 presented	 in	 this	 thesis	 show,	 these	 actions	 and	outcomes	 can	be	 intentional	 and	
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In	 chapter	 2,	 ANT	 helped	me	 understand	 eco-innovation	 as	 an	 actor-network	 that	 is	 per-
formed	in	a	variety	of	ways,	and	that	consists	of	evolving	relations	between	human	and	non-
human	elements.	This	conceptualisation	made	it	possible	to	identify	the	firm-centred	inter-
pretations	 of	 eco-innovation	 that	 dominate	 the	 eco-innovation	 literature	 –	 a	 feature	 this	
literature	 shares	 with	 innovation	 studies	 (see	 e.g.	 Fagerberg	 et	 al.,	 2012,	 Fagerberg	 &	





















the	move	 from	ANT	to	discourse	 theory	was	a	straightforward	one.	Both	 treat	 reality	as	a	







and	 interpretivist	conceptualisations	that	understand	 innovation	as	a	product	of	 the	(com-








to	 explain	 interactions	between	material	 and	 social	worlds	with	 the	help	of	 an	 integrated	
ontology	and	epistemology.	And	they	assume	that	reality	is	multiple	and	performed:	an	ef-
fect	of	distinct	and	continuously	reproduced	interpretations	of	materiality	and	(other)	social	
elements.	The	theoretical	notions	 ‘material	events’	 (Duineveld	et	al.,	2017)	and	 ‘reality	ef-
fects’	 (Van	Assche	et	al.,	2020)	 functioned	as	a	bridge,	 linking	 the	different	 theories.	 I	will	
reflect	on	these	notions	next.		
The	notion	of	material	events	proved	useful	in	constructing	an	analytical	distinction	between	
change	 and	 innovation.	 Change	 evolves	 through	 interactions	 between	material	 and	 social	
worlds;	whereas	 innovation	emerges	and	obtains	meaning	through	these	 interactions.	This	
analytical	distinction,	in	my	view,	is	imperative	as	innovation	is	not	the	only	possible	coordi-













novation	 constitutes	 sometimes	gradual	 and	at	other	 times	 rather	 sudden	 redefinitions	of	
material	and	social	worlds.	 It	 can	create	or	erode	distinctions	as	well	 as	 completely	 trans-
form	the	identities	of	focal	objects	(Latour,	1990).	Viewed	in	this	way,	innovation	transcends	
the	attempts	of	individuals	or	organisations	to	realise	an	idea	of	some	kind.	Aided	by	its	con-
ceptual	 vagueness,	 innovation	 provides	 fertile	 grounds	 for	 different,	 competing	 ideas	 to	















innovation	 as	 the	 basis	 of	 economic	 growth;	 innovation	 is	 portrayed	 as	 the	 unquestioned	

















tivities	 sparked	 competitions	 for	 influence	 (chapter	 2	 &	 4)	 or	 competitions	 for	 influence	
evoked	interpretations	of	innovation	(chapter	3).	Regardless	of	their	existence	as	communi-
cations	 or	 materialised	 practices	 –	 these	 activities	 generated	 their	 own	 support	 and	 re-
sistance.	Actors	constantly	evaluated	their	positions	and	commitments.	Viewed	in	this	way,	
competitions	 for	 influence	 –	particularly	 those	 revolving	 around	environmental	 controver-
sies	 (cf.	Hajer,	1996)	–	are	a	hostile	setting	for	accomplishing	solutions.	Solutions	may	end	




limited	 attention	 in	 mainstream	 innovation	 literature.	 It	 is	 usually	 considered	 in	 abstract	
terms	as	the	power	of	markets,	consumers,	and	knowledge	(Fagerberg,	2003;	Martin,	2016;	
2012).	Fagerberg	(2003)	and	Martin	(2016)	locate	it	–	rather	one-sidedly	–	in	the	old	ideas,	




As	 the	 case	 studies	 presented	 in	 this	 thesis	 illustrate,	 innovation	 is	 an	 attractive	 idea	 to	
strategising	 actors	who	 attempt	 to	 reinforce	 their	 positions	 of	 power.	 Innovation	 is	 com-
monly	 considered	 as	 inherently	 good	 and	 value-free	 but	 lacking	 in	 clear	 definitions	 (Blok,	
2018b;	 Bontems,	 2014;	Godin,	 2015).	 This	 combination	 grants	 actors	 operating	 under	 the	
innovation	banner	space	to	manoeuvre.	As	a	seemingly	value-free	 idea,	 innovation	 is	diffi-













In	 this	 thesis,	 I	 presented	 evidence	 of	 how	 innovation	 simultaneously	 gives	 shape	 to	 new	
directions	and	holds	back	change	(Bontems,	2014).	This	inherent	contradiction	of	innovation	
has	 been	 largely	 overlooked	 in	 the	mainstream	 innovation	 literature.	 Recent	 self-analysis	
identifies	 the	 field’s	 bias	 towards	 high-tech	 innovation	 and	 its	 dated	 economic	 rationale	
(Martin,	 2016).	 Similarly,	 emerging	 spin-off	 literatures	 scrutinise	 the	 current	 econom-
ic/technological	 fixation	of	 innovation.	 These	 literatures	 promote	 various	 alternative	 acro-
nyms	 and	 labels	 of	 innovation	 as	 capable	 of	 addressing	 contemporary	 sustainability	 chal-
lenges	 (see	 e.g.	 Hellstrom,	 2003;	 Soete,	 2013;	 Lechevalier,	 2019).	 Some	 of	 these	 labels	 –




established	 institutions	and	actors	 (cf.	Kooij	et	al.,	2012).	 In	chapter	2,	 the	engineers	envi-
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sioned	their	technology	as	a	device	that	would	make	tour	operators	reduce	the	carbon	foot-
print	 of	 their	 product	 portfolios.	 Instead,	 CARAMCAL	 also	made	 soft	 approaches	 possible	
(i.e.	 carbon	 offsetting),	 increasing	 the	 legitimacy	 of	 tour	 packages	 containing	 (long-haul)	
flights.	The	proponents	of	climate	 justice	 in	chapter	3	 faced	an	 industry	coalition	that	pro-
posed	 technological	 innovation	as	a	 strategy	 to	 realise	a	 ‘smart’	 and	 ‘sustainable’	 aviation	




in	efficiency-focused	organisations	often	 lack	 (see	e.g.	Doz	&	Kosonen,	2010).	But	 the	ulti-
mate	version	of	the	innovation	unit	bolstered	the	organisation’s	efficiency-driven	corporate	
strategy	and	the	position	of	its	proponents	in	senior	management.	Thus,	conservative	prac-
tices	 prevailed	 that	 used	 the	 created	 novelty	 to	maintain	 the	 status	 quo.	Or,	 as	 Bontems	
(2014,	p.	55)	puts	it,	“everything	must	change	so	that	everything	can	stay	the	same”.	
Innovation	 is	 therefore	not	 to	be	viewed	as	 the	exclusive	domain	of	 the	protagonists:	 the	




associates	 in	 the	Dutch	 government;	 TUI’s	 corporate	 executives	 and	 short-term	profit	 ori-



















logical	 innovations,	 namely	 the	 impacts	 of	 their	 instrumental	 application	 on	 society.	 They	




logical	 innovation	by	 itself	does	not	necessarily	 instigate	 the	 type	of	 change	aspired	by	 its	
creators	(see	Latour,	1996b	for	a	case	in	point).	As	chapter	2	illustrated,	once	in	the	hands	of	
its	 users,	 CARMACAL	 made	 different	 and	 contradicting	 carbon	 management	 approaches	
possible.	These	approaches	embodied	‘strong’	and	‘weak’	forms	of	sustainability	(Hansson,	
2010)	 and	 conflicting	 socio-technical	 imaginaries	 (Strand,	 Saltelli,	 Giampietro	 et	 al.,	 2016;	
Jasanoff	&	Kim,	2009).	CARMACAL	succeeded	–	albeit	temporary	–	in	holding	these	different	
ideas	together,	realising	tourism	industry	support	for	effective	climate	action.	Thus,	techno-





















In	this	thesis	 I	showed	innovation	 is	a	dominant	 idea	 in	tourism-related	organisations,	as	a	
goal,	rhetoric,	as	a	practice,	and	so	on.	It	will	remain	prominent	in	the	future,	not	less	so	in	
times	of	crisis,	such	as	the	Covid-19	pandemic.	Actors	in	government,	business,	and	society	
at	 large	will	 continue	 to	 see	 innovation	as	 something	good	and	beneficial.	At	 some	point,	
actors	advocating	change	are	likely	to	adopt	or	come	across	the	concept	of	innovation	and,	
as	the	examples	 I	presented	 in	this	thesis	suggest,	 run	up	against	structural	 limits	of	some	
kind.		
Over	 the	 past	 five	 years,	 I	 got	 the	 impression	 that,	 sooner	 or	 later,	 these	 protagonists	 of	
change	will	encounter	chameleons	on	their	path:	hegemonic	strategising	actors	that	repre-
sent	 the	 status	 quo	 and	 that	 –	 like	 their	 reptilian	 equivalent	 –	 change	 colour	 to	 suit	 the	







cased	 and	 heralded	 Silicon	 Valley	market	 shake-ups	 at	 near-delusional	 levels	 (chapter	 1);	
certain	participants	of	a	carbon	management	project	tacitly	frustrated	its	progress	(chapter	
2);	 aviation	 sector	 incumbents	 began	preaching	 smart	 and	 sustainable	 aviation	out	 of	 the	










cies	begin	 to	 lose	 their	 relevance	 (cf.	Van	Assche	et	al.,	2014).	The	protagonists	of	change	
should	 therefore	 treat	 the	 first	 sightings	of	 chameleons	 as	 a	 sign	of	 hope	and	encourage-
ment:	transformation,	after	all,	could	be	 just	around	the	corner.	Below	I	will	wrap	up	with	







tuating	–	and	arguably	reinstalling	–	 the	political	dimension	of	 innovation	as	a	concept	 for	
coordinating	novelty.	 Such	 an	exercise,	 in	my	 view,	 could	 comprise	 two	 steps,	 as	 detailed	
below.		
We	could	begin	with	 research	 that	examines	 from	up	close	 the	competitions	 for	 influence	
that	emerge	when	strategising	actors	use	 the	 term	 innovation.	Such	examinations	of	 their	
innovation-related	 communications	 and	 practices	 are	 in	my	 view	 a	 helpful	 and	 necessary	
first	 step,	 because	 mainstream	 and	 tourism	 innovation	 literatures	 have	 been	 dominated	
with	research	focusing	on	the	measurement	of	innovation.	As	explained	in	chapter	4,	there	
is	 nothing	wrong	with	 that.	Measurement	makes	 comparison	 and	 benchmarking	 possible.	
The	 resulting	 statistics	 and	 related	 terminology	 however	 depict	 innovation	 as	 a	 technical	








centrate	on	 the	 (collective)	knowledge	and	skills	 that	are	 required	of	entrepreneurial	 indi-
viduals	 if	 they	wish	 to	accomplish	successful	 innovations.	The	politics	 that	comes	with	 the	
enactment	 of	 entrepreneurial	 identities,	 opportunities,	 failures,	 and	 successes	 (see	 e.g.	









This	undertaking	could	begin	with	a	 focus	on	the	first	half	of	 the	20th	century.	 In	this	war-
marked	epoch,	 interpretations	of	 innovation	were	 less	 sterile	 than	 the	ones	 that	emerged	
with	 the	 rise	of	 technological	 innovation	 studies	 from	 the	1960s	onwards	 (see	 chapter	1).	












production	system,	but	resembles	 its	 limits	 (Blok,	2018a).	Future	research	could	treat	 it	as	
such.		
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This	 interpretation	 of	 innovation	 puts	 the	 figure	 of	 the	 Schumpeterian	 entrepreneur	 in	 a	
different	light.	Nowadays	embraced	as	the	driving	force	of	start-ups	that	shake	up	markets	
with	new	products	 and	 services	 in	 tourism	and	beyond	 (see	Calvino,	 Criscuolo,	&	Menon,	
2016;	OECD	&	Eurostat,	2018;	Pikkemaat	et	al.,	2019),	in	the	early	20th	century,	Schumpet-
er’s	entrepreneur	was	an	organiser	rather	than	an	inventor;	a	fixer	of	some	kind.	Entrepre-
neurs	did	not	necessarily	 trade,	but	 combined,	 adopted,	 and	 imitated	 (by	 copying	novelty	
from	elsewhere),	renewing	elites	as	they	progressed.	If	this	character	had	a	business,	it	was	
the	business	of	overcoming	resistance	to	change	(cf.	Fagerberg	et	al.,	2012).	This	process,	in	


























solution	 was	 gradualism:	 in	 attempts	 to	 improve	 conditions,	 the	 innovator	 should	 follow	
rather	than	oppose	the	natural	ways	of	things	and	operate	quietly	and	–	unlike	Machiavelli’s	
innovator	–	openly	and	slowly,	akin	to	time	itself	(Godin,	2015).		






not	 by	 changing	 colours	 but	 through	 a	 natural	 evolution	 of	 its	 species.	 These	 approaches	











and	 seemingly	 value-free	 interpretations	 and	 representations	 of	 innovation	 that	 tend	 to	
equate	the	concept	with	commercialised	technological	invention	are	therefore	deeply	prob-




















tomed	 to	 the	 practice	 of	 experimentation	 (see	 Brown,	 Farrely	 &	 Loorbach,	 2013).	 In	 this	
way,	you	can	use	soft	spaces	to	make	it	clear	what	the	underlying	assumptions	of	conven-
tional	 practices	 in	 your	 organisation	 are,	 but	 also	 in	 government,	 business,	 and	 society	 at	
large.		





vehicle	 of	 process	 excellence	 (chapter	 4).	 Hopefully,	 one	 day,	 policy	mechanisms	 such	 as	
RAAK	(chapter	2)	can	be	altered	so	that	they	can	be	used	to	stimulate	the	development	of	
soft	 spaces.	 These	mechanisms	 then	would	 first	have	 to	abandon	 their	output-orientation	
(see	also	Smith,	Voβ	&	Grin,	2010)	and	install	performance	indicators	that	include	the	value	
of	the	lessons	learned	(of	particular	interest	are	the	lessons	we	learn	from	failures);	the	ar-























innovation	 (see	above).	 Institutions	are	however	not	easily	 replaced.	They	constitute	 rules	
and	norms	that	have	structured	interactions	for	prolonged	periods	of	time	and	that	are	em-







ronmental	policy	struggle,	but	 it	shows	that	consistently	confronting	 institutions	with	 their	
imminent	irrelevance	can	ultimately	topple	them.		
Similarly,	in	chapter	4,	the	package	holiday	conglomerate	TUI	can	be	viewed	as	an	institution	

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































has	 always	been	 very	 receptive	 to	 external	 shocks:	 the	Dutch	 travel	 industry.	 Prior	 to	 the	
current	pandemic,	 this	 industry	has	showed	an	 increased	fascination	with	 its	own	 (lack	of)	




technological	 innovation	 literature	and	research	on	 innovation	 in	 tourism	studies.	 In	 these	
literatures,	 innovation	 is	 generally	 interpreted	as	 commercialised	 technology.	While	 litera-
tures	 propagating	 alternative	 forms	 of	 innovation	 did	 scrutinise	 this	 current	 economic-
technological	purpose	of	innovation,	they	did	not	question	the	concept	of	innovation	itself.		
In	this	PhD	thesis	 I	 therefore	studied	the	use	and	effects	of	the	discourse	on	 innovation	 in	




operators	 (chapter	 2);	 the	 impact	 of	 a	 PhD	 thesis	 on	 aviation-induced	 climate	 change	 on	
Dutch	aviation	policy	(chapter	3);	and	the	development	of	an	innovation	unit	in	a	large	tour-
ism	 organisation	 (chapter	 4).	 Two	 notions	 of	 Evolutionary	 Governance	 Theory	 –	material	
events	and	reality	effects	–	functioned	as	an	overarching	analytical	framework	that	enabled	
an	integrated	analysis	of	the	case	studies.	Material	events	explain	innovation	as	a	construct	
that	 emerges	when	 different	 actors	 coordinate	 responses	 to	 a	 perceived	 change	 of	 some	






















tion-induced	 climate	 change	as	 an	 international	policy	 issue.	Opposing	actors,	 such	as	 the	
environmental	movement,	had	never	 found	a	 realistic	or	 impactful	way	 to	exert	 influence	
until	the	PhD	thesis	helped	to	reintroduce	the	object	of	aviation-induced	climate	change	to	
this	decades-old	national	policy	pathway.	New	actors	–	citizen	action	groups,	environmental	
NGOs	–	 subsequently	entered	 the	debate.	 Innovation	 comprised	 the	environmental	policy	
struggle	that	subsequently	unfolded	and	the	additional	knowledge	objects	that	were	drawn	
into	the	discussion,	notably	the	object	of	 ‘technological	 innovation’.	So	far,	 the	promise	of	
future	 technologies	 has	 proved	 particularly	 effective	 in	 blocking	 alternative	 policy	 options	
and	 this	 environmental	 policy	 struggle	 continues	until	 today	with	no	 change	of	 the	 status	
quo	in	sight.		
Chapter	4	investigates	the	productive	role	of	innovation	in	organisations	by	tracing	the	de-






people	 discuss	 innovation,	 accentuating	 TUI’s	 structural	 weaknesses	 that,	 until	 that	 mo-
ment,	 had	 been	 ‘known	 unknowns’	 –	 blind	 spots	 that	managers	 and	 staff	were	 generally	
aware	of	but	could	not	directly	address.	The	chapter	shows	how	the	concept	of	innovation	
itself,	 through	 its	 use	 in	 organisational	 practices,	 can	 trigger	 novelties.	 Different	 forms	 of	
organisational	discontent	that	questioned	the	organisation’s	concurrent	strategy	and	its	fu-
ture	became	more	explicit	and	functioned	as	a	reservoir	of	productive	arguments	that	ena-




the	 research	 question,	 I	 first	 illustrate	 the	 reality	 effects	 of	 innovation	 as	 collections	 of	
emergent,	 conflicting	 practices	 and	 communications	 that	 generate	 their	 own	 support	 and	
resistance.	As	the	conclusion	highlights	the	political	dimension	of	innovation,	I	then	discuss	
innovation	as	politics	vis-à-vis	the	reviewed	literature.	In	this	discussion	I	shed	light	on	two	
important	elements	of	 innovation’s	political	dimension:	 the	paradox	of	 innovation	and	the	
role	 of	 technology	 innovation	 as	 a	 discursive	 object.	 The	 paradox	 of	 innovation	 highlights	




their	 reptilian	 equivalent	 –	 change	 colour	 but	 do	 not	 their	 shape.	 They	 proclaim	 commit-



































innovatie	 min	 of	 meer	 gelijkgesteld	 aan	 e-commerce.	 Een	 vergelijkbaar	 technisch-
economisch	frame	is	ook	terug	te	vinden	in	de	gangbare	technologische	innovatieliteratuur	
en	in	de	toerismeliteratuur	over	innovatie.	In	diverse	spin-off	literatuur	wordt	dit	dominante	
economisch	 doel	 van	 innovatie	 wel	 bekritiseerd.	 Vervolgens	 worden	 echter	 alternatieve	
vormen	van	 innovatie	gepromoot.	Het	 concept	 innovatie	 zelf	wordt	 in	deze	 literatuur	niet	
ter	discussie	gesteld.		
In	 dit	 proefschrift	 onderzocht	 ik	 daarom	het	 gebruik	 en	 de	 effecten	 van	 het	 innovatiedis-
cours	binnen	toerisme.	Met	behulp	van	verschillende	theorieën	gebaseerd	op	poststructura-
listisch	gedachtengoed	–	actor-netwerktheorie;	discourstheorie;	en	evolutionaire	governan-

















innovatie	 om	bij	 te	 dragen	 aan	 duurzaamheidstransities	 in	 toerisme,	met	 behulp	 van	 een	





tificatie	 introduceerde.	 Dit	 leidde	 tot	 een	 gedeelde	 interesse	 in	 het	 meten	 van	 de	 CO2-
voetafdruk	 van	 pakketreizen.	 Een	 samenwerking	 ontstond:	 de	 touroperators	 namen	 deel	
aan	een	gesubsidieerd	project	voor	de	ontwikkeling	van	CARMACAL:	 software	die	het	uni-
form	meten	 van	 de	 CO2-voetafdruk	mogelijk	maakt.	 CARMACAL	was	 echter	 gebaseerd	 op	










uitbreidingspolitiek	 van	 Schiphol	 en	 KLM	 ter	 discussie	 stelde.	 Nieuwe	 actoren,	waaronder	
actievoerende	burgers	en	milieuorganisaties,	mengden	zich	vervolgens	in	het	debat.	Innova-








de	 efficiency-gedreven	 werkomgeving	 van	 deze	 multinational	 managers	 en	 medewerkers	





waren	 tot	op	dat	moment	 slechts	blinde	 vlekken.	Men	was	 zich	 van	hun	bestaan	bewust,	
maar	had	er	geen	directe	invloed	op.	Het	hoofdstuk	laat	daarmee	zien	hoe	het	concept	in-
novatie	zelf,	simpelweg	door	gebruikt	te	worden	in	organisatiepraktijken,	kan	leiden	tot	ver-





Hoofdstuk	5	presenteert	de	 conclusie,	 discussie	 en	 consequenties	 van	dit	 onderzoek.	Ant-
woord	gevend	op	de	onderzoeksvraag,	illustreer	ik	in	dit	hoofdstuk	eerst	de	werkelijkheids-
effecten	 van	 innovatie	 als	ontluikende,	onderling	 tegenstrijdige,	 uitingen	en	praktijken	die	




als	discursief	object.	De	paradox	van	 innovatie	benadrukt	dat	pogingen	om	 iets	nieuws	 te	
creëren	 kunnen	 leiden	 tot	 het	 tegenovergestelde:	 een	 versterking	 van	 de	 status	 quo.	 De	






































space	 for	me	 to	 hide	 and	write	 and	 accepting	my	 absence	 on	 scores	 of	 social	 occasions.	
Thank	 you	 Harmke	 Klunder	 for	 enabling	my	 escapism.	 I	 am	 immensely	 grateful	 for	 those	
hermetic	writing	retreats	in	your	forest	cabin:	the	bulk	of	this	thesis	has	been	imagined	and	
written	 there.	Thank	you	Daan	Buijtendijk,	 Ilse	Buijtendijk,	and	Rik	de	Bloois	 for	your	 love	













sibility	 to	do	a	PhD	studying	 the	Dutch	 travel	 industry	circulated.	Ondrej	Mitas	and	Sebas-
tiaan	Straatman	(unwittingly?)	convinced	me	to	give	it	a	shot.	Lilya	Terzieva	and	Rico	Lie	en-
dorsed	me.	An	idea	that	has	since	disappeared	completely	ended	up	in	a	PhD	proposal	that	

























time.	 The	 twisted	 and	 aspiring	 electro-punk	 house	 of	 LFToT	 provided	 the	mental	 parallel	
universe	necessary	to	navigate	these	contradictions.	 I	played	that	album	more	or	 less	on	a	
continuous	basis	while	writing,	particularly	during	multiple-day	 retreats	 in	Harmke’s	 forest	
cabin.	I	would	like	to	thank	Eke	Eijgelaar	for	the	very	pleasant,	effective,	and	complementary	
collaboration	 during	 the	 entire	 process	 (research	 design,	 data	 collection,	 paper	 writing,	
submission,	and	revision).	I	really	hope	that	we	can	do	more	of	this	sort	of	stuff	in	the	future.	
I	want	to	thank	Xavier	Font	again	here	for	pointing	out	the	possibility	to	contribute	to	the	
Journal	 of	 Sustainable	 Tourism	 special	 issue	 on	 research	 impact	 and	 Raymond	 Boland	 for	
proofreading	 an	 early	 version	 of	 the	 manuscript.	 And	 I	 am	 particularly	 grateful	 to	 Paul	
Peeters,	 who	 was	 willing	 to	 offer	 his	 PhD	 thesis	 as	 study	 object.	 The	 two	 lengthy	 ‘Paul	
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ably	my	 favourite	 Sonic	 Youth	 album	–	 she	 nailed	 the	 vibe	 that	 gradually	 emerged	 as	my	
work	on	chapter	4	progressed	and	 I	encountered	different	people	who	all	worked	hard	 in	













ward	Huijbens	 for	 offering	me	 a	monastic	work	 environment	 on	 the	Wageningen	 campus	
during	semi-lockdown	times.	Gwendolyn	van	den	Berg	for	the	pleasant	collaboration	back	in	
2016	and	2017.	Unfortunately,	that	study	did	not	evolve	into	a	paper,	but	parts	of	the	desk	
research	 I	 conducted	 at	 the	 time	 informed	 the	 introduction.	 Erdinç	 Çakmak	 for	 sharing	 a	
pretty	useful	document	about	how	to	write	a	good	introduction	and	synthesis	of	a	PhD	the-
sis.	And	René	van	der	Duim	and	Martijn	Duineveld	for	their	valuable	advice	and	eye	for	de-
tail	throughout	the	‘final’	process.		
So	thank	all	of	you.	You	have	collectively	constructed	a	creative	space	for	me	that	I	could	use	
to	write	the	thesis	that	I	wanted	to	write.	This	road	has	come	to	an	end.	But	no	idea,	thought	
or	line	would	have	advanced	from	one	state	to	another	without	Renske	and	Doris.	Your	en-
durance,	humour,	and	patience	made	this	possible,	particularly	during	tough	times.	Without	
your	love,	there	would	have	been	no	story	to	tell;	no	book	to	put	on	that	shelf.		
166	
So	that’s	it.	With	all	of	this	said	and	done,	it	is	time	to	look	ahead.	Endings,	after	all,	are	arti-
ficial	constructs	of	writers.	Minds	don’t	stop	at	the	last	page.	New	stories	are	always	in	the	
making.	And	I	am	looking	forward	to	telling	them.		
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